751J.00/8–753: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
245. Repeated Paris 72. Crown Prince Savang, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and other members Laotian Government spent two days in Saigon this week returning from France to Vientiane.
Savang and Souvanna Phouma said that there was no urgency with regard to negotiations with France on basis of French declaration of July and that Laotian taking over of services now controlled by French would be done in an “evolutionary” and not “revolutionary” manner.
With regard to the Pau Agreements,1 Laos has taken the position that they will not negotiate new arrangements with France or other countries until one of parties has formally informed other signatories of its intention to denounce agreements. Cambodian Government had announced on radio and in press interviews that they intended to break Currency and Customs Union Agreements but has not officially served notice to Laos or Vietnam to that effect. Savang said that Laos had no objection to present quadripartite agreements and from purely economic viewpoint regretted their abrogation. Main trouble was Cambodian hatred and fear of Vietnam. It was this Cambodian attitude toward Vietnam that made any tripartite or quadripartite agreement practically impossible.
Both Crown Prince and Souvanna Phouma were less concerned with new arrangements with France for greater independence for Laos than with problem of military protection of their country. Savang insisted if French would give them arms and permission to go ahead that by commando operations existing Laotian units during remainder of rainy season could decimate Viet Minh battalions which [Page 720] had remained in Laos, presently divided among villages for necessary shelter from rains.
Savang expressed belief that with return of dry weather Viet Minh would not attempt to repeat their invasion of Laos last spring. They would, however, maintain battalions still in Laos and continue their by no means unsuccessful political indoctrination and infiltration of mountain peoples and villages. Viet Minh had, he said, sent promising youngsters for political schooling in China and he believed even some were being sent to Moscow.
Savang went on to say that if contrary to his expectations Viet Minh launched another fairly large-scale push and attempted to reach Mekong, move would be ordered by Chinese Communists and would be prelude to Communist attempt to take over Thailand. If Viet Minh could really establish themselves on Mekong, he thought Thailand might easily fall under Communist sway. Thai Government and army were weak and there would be no spirit in people to resist such an invasion. Pridi, according to Savang, is more Chinese than Siamese and would probably work for Communists.
Comment: General Navarre will accompany DeJean to Laos next day or two and will investigate possibility of Laotians conducting with French help counter-guerilla operation during rains. All DeJean would say to me about Prince’s optimism regarding success of commando operations against Viet Minh was that “he hoped Prince was right in his estimate of Laotian capacity to conduct such operations”.
Without being very explicit, DeJean clearly indicated that problem of protecting Laos against Viet Minh operations and at same time protecting Tonkin delta was a very difficult, not to say anxious, problem for French Command.
- See footnote 4, p. 30.↩