751G.00/8–353: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
221. Repeated information Paris 67, Hanoi unnumbered. I had long talk with Cheysson, French political adviser to President Tam, over week end. He remarked that the long interregnum that occurred while French were trying to form government last May and June had one relieving advantage. Political leaders had had really to think out problem of Indochina and government that finally emerged came up with ideal policy expressed in the declaration of July 3.
Policy, Cheysson said, was excellent but reasoning and lack of determination behind this policy on part of Reynaud and other leaders were very far from ideal. He had talked with Reynaud, Bidault and others and, in general, feared there was no real intention to accompany more liberal policy toward Associated States with effective measures to carry on war here until victories won. On contrary, he thought Reynaud and others, while willing to increase French military effort [Page 713] for a short term, provided financial help from US was available, had no intention of continuing present effort over any protracted period. Instead they hoped for sufficient victories to enable them to make some sort of deal with Chinese or Viet Minh, and thus allow France to withdraw troops and reduce expenditures without apparent loss of face or honor.