Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Substance of Discussions of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, July 17, 1953, 11 a.m.¹

top secret

Washington, July 17, 1953, 11 a.m.

Present

• General O’Daniel
• General Bradley
• General Collins
• General Ridgway²
• Admiral Fechteler
• General Twining³
• Admiral Radford⁴
• General Shepherd
• General Eddleman
• General White
• Admiral Gardner
• General Lemnitzer
• Admiral Conolly⁵
• General Everest
• General Partridge
• Colonel Carns
• Captain Phillips
• Mr. H. Freeman Matthews
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson
• Mr. U. A. Johnson
• Mr. Jacob Beam
• Mr. Philip Bonsal
• Mr. James Bonbright
• Mr. Charles C. Stelle
• NSC
• General Gerhart
• Mr. S. Everett Gleason

Report by General O’Daniel⁶

(O’Daniel began his presentation by reading the terms of reference of the O’Daniel Mission.)

General O’Daniel: On the 8th of June we were briefed by officers from the State Department and here in the Pentagon. We assembled at my headquarters in Honolulu and left for Saigon on the 18th of June, arriving in Saigon on the 20th. We called on Ambassador Heath and then made a series of calls and held discussions with a number of French and Vietnamese leaders. We talked with Prime Minister Tam and I was much impressed with his forthrightness and honesty. Tam is a naturalized French citizen but he seems to be a sincere Vietnamese Nationalist. We talked with Defense Minister Quat, who seems like a first-rate man. We had, of course, many talks with Navarre. Navarre seems to be thoroughly respected by the Vietnamese and the French as well as by our own people. He was a Division Commander in World War II and I think he has sound and aggressive ideas. We talked with General Hinh who is a capable young fellow and who, incidentally, is the son of Premier Tam and also like Tam a naturalized French citizen. We talked with Bao Dai and a considerable number of military and civilian leaders. In general the war in Indochina is a political as well as military war. There is a large number of Third Force people who right now are against both the French and the Vietnamese [Viet Minh]. If the Associated States were granted full independence it is our feeling that these fence sitters would be in favor of the Associated States and against the Communists. French military organization so far is for defense only.

The territories are divided up into defense areas with each area commander in command of a certain number of battalions. If there are operations in any area, battalions are assigned to the commander of that area for his control. In some areas there are dependents of the armed forces living in compounds right near the military units, so obviously those units are not too much good for offensive operations. When Navarre gave us our initial briefing, he presented what in fact was a rehash of the LeTourneau-Allard Plan. The plan, as you know, calls for no operation to be undertaken until September 15, at which time operations would start in an attempt to clear the Central and Southern Annam. After these operations the plan called for regrouping forces and undertaking in 1954 and 1955 attacks in the Delta in the North. All through these initial briefings the French repeatedly described the situation as difficult. I think the word difficult was used 50 or 100 times in their initial briefings. I finally made it a rule in my group that anybody that even spoke the word difficult would be fined a dollar and I think by the end of the visit we were out of the habit of using it. After the French had completed their briefings they asked us if we had any questions. We came right out frankly with our questions on their plan. We pointed out that the French had plenty of amphibious equipment and that during the rainy season the rice paddies were 5 or 6 feet deep in water and that the area was so flooded that the enemy had to concentrate in villages. We pointed out we thought under these conditions the French had at their disposal considerable mobility whereas the enemy was tied down. We thought that the French could do a lot immediately during the rainy season this summer and that if they went ahead with action this summer they should be in a position to attack in the Delta this autumn. Later we put our ideas down in writing and gave them to Navarre.

The French had originally planned to give us 5 days of briefings but after our first day of briefing we told them we wanted to get out for a look-see right away. We broke up into three groups. I had been through the Delta positions when I was last out in Indochina so I spent my time looking into various types of training facilities which they have set up throughout Indochina. The two other groups covered the military positions and the establishments of the various services throughout Indochina. When we had surveyed the situation pretty thoroughly we went back to Saigon to talk with Navarre. We had sent Navarre a paper⁷ which included the ideas on what it was possible to do so that he had had a chance to go over it.

(At this point General O’Daniel passed out photographs taken on his mission and showed some movies which had been taken by a member of the mission.)

I had a two and one-half hour conference with Navarre. I first told him that he could call together enough forces to organize 7 divisions and that he could use 5 of these to break out of the Delta positions and 2 to block on the southwestern flank. Navarre said that it was just impossible to get 7 divisions together from forces which were already there. He finally said he could get together 3 divisions. I finally agreed with Navarre that it would be important to try and get 2 divisions of troops from France which would of course have to come out of NATO.

We had prepared other studies which I gave to Navarre. One of these was on recommendations for reorganization of forces and one on recommendations for the reorganization of training schools. Both the forces and the schools suffer from a lack of coordination at the top. Area commanders and school commanders are given their instructions and then they are almost completely on their own. For example, Trapnell visited one company which had not seen its battalion commander for 6 months. We made our ideas on organization available to Navarre.

We also agreed with Navarre that there should be a French MAAG and that we should have 3 U.S. officers attached to it. Our thought was that through this device we would be in a position to have an indirect influence on training.

Navarre, after our conference and before he left for France, handed me his plan entitled Principles for Conduct of the War in Indochina, which I summarized in a telegram back here.⁸ (At this point O’Daniel read the telegram summarizing Navarre’s plan which had been previously received in the Department.)

Our general estimate is that the Vietnamese can be developed into a first-rate fighting army. They have not been as yet really given an opportunity to develop leaders. Our thought is that if the French could organize them in divisions, the French could then have division advisers just as we do in Korea and the Vietnamese would have the chance to develop leadership experience. In general we think the training system which the French are using is pretty good—it does lack coordination at the top. I saw two bad training centers in which sanitary and other conditions were not adequate but there are also some well run training centers. Even though the French say that they don’t like the methods which we are using in Korea, they have actually adopted some of our methods in Indochina. The schools don’t make enough use of training aids and they don’t make enough out of the equipment which they have.

The Air Force has enough planes to carry out the mission which they have been assigned but is short in pilots and mechanics. The Air Force has a very poor system of maintenance and is too decentralized. The 10,000 personnel ceiling on the air force is too low.

We believe there is need to organize an amphibious corps. The French have plenty of landing craft which they can use but these landing craft are scattered all over Indochina. The Army and Navy both need reorganization in order to increase centralization and coordination at the top.

To sum up, we reached agreements with the French and Vietnamese that the French would attempt to recover a maximum number of units and to organize a striking force of at least three divisions and to undertake offensive operations in Tonkin in September. The French agreed also to undertake offensives this summer including raids on Langson, Thai-Nguyen, Yen Bay, and Hu Xhan; to undertake clearing operations at Tourane and to undertake breaking out operations from Phan Tiet.

The Langson operation was due to be undertaken July 16 and as you have read in the newspapers it went on on schedule.

(General O’Daniel then read the recommendations of his report and distributed copies of the report. The recommendations included sending qualified experts to assist in the development of local industry, particularly in developing the manufacture of small arms, batteries, and facilities for recapping tires; approval of increase in the artillery allotment and table of equipment; approval of the attachment of 3 U.S. officers to a French MAAG; approval of the attachment of 2 additional military attachés for work with the French on combat intelligence; approval of the return of O’Daniel to Indochina in 4 or 5 months time for a follow-up.)

General Ridgway: What is the quality of the French combat intelligence?

General O’Daniel: By and large it is pretty poor. They do not do enough patrolling to get adequate combat intelligence. They do get some intelligence—for example, one commander up in the forward area has made contacts with the villages around and almost on a personal basis, has secured pretty good intelligence on Vietnamese movements in his area. With no offensive impetus from the top, however, their combat intelligence is of a low order.

General Collins: Navarre has asked for 2 divisions from France. In view of the small likelihood that the French will be willing to send 2 divisions, how important is it to Navarre’s success that he get these divisions from the outside.

General O’Daniel: This would be the only way that he would think that he could undertake an all-out attack this fall.

General Bradley: Could he undertake an attack with the troops that he has on hand?

General O’Daniel: He could if he would, but the French are afraid that if they take too many troops from their present garrisons they will be in trouble.

Admiral Radford: They are afraid to withdraw their garrison troops because of the political difficulties that they would run into in Cambodia and Laos.

General Collins: How about the troops that are in the Forts in the Delta. As I understand it there are something like 50 battalions tied up in those Delta Forts.

Admiral Radford: That is where Navarre is planning to get his three divisions from.

General O’Daniel: They do have to police the areas that they control. Combat troops are tied up by the Vietminh irregulars and the militia are not yet organized to free the combat troops from this duty.

General Collins: It is now the middle of July. Do you think Navarre can train and organize three divisions by September?

General O’Daniel: I think he can.

Mr. Bonsal: These units have already functioned as “groupes mobiles” so that they have experience in operating as units.

General Collins: They will need, however, training in divisional operations and I don’t think they can get that in a hurry.

General Ridgway: As I understand it equipment is no problem and manpower is no problem. What is lacking is leadership, spirit, organization and intangibles. Is it true there is no specific logistic problem that requires our help?

General O’Daniel: With the exception of a possible increase in artillery, I think it is fair to say there is no logistic problem.

General Twining: How about the Air Force?

General O’Daniel: They have enough planes but they are short of mechanics and pilots.

Admiral Conolly: Is it fair to say the French have more capability than they have yet used?

General O’Daniel: Yes, I think that is a fair statement.

Admiral Conolly: Who is going to follow up on your mission to see that the French go ahead with the plans they have made?

General O’Daniel: I thought I would keep in touch with Navarre by letter and if the Chiefs are willing, can go out there later on to follow up.

General Collins: Why don’t we use Trapnell to follow up. He is a first class soldier and he is there on the spot. It seems to me that that would be more efficient than trying to follow up from your headquarters in Honolulu.

General O’Daniel: That would be a good way of doing it, but Trapnell will need to have his mission broadened. (At this point Secretary Wilson joined the meeting.)

General Ridgway: Is it your estimate that there are major weaknesses in leadership and training on the part of the French?

General O’Daniel: Yes, I think that is right.

General Ridgway: Then I don’t think we can say that the French plans are adequate because I don’t think they are adequate in terms of strength and in terms of objective.

General Bradley: How about the effect of the political situation on the French plans?

General O’Daniel: The July 3d French statement was good as far as it went, but it does not seem to have gone far enough.

Mr. Wilson: These meetings that we have been having have been very encouraging on that score. I don’t know whether the French are planning to make further statements here, but they have certainly told us that they are going to promise these people independence.

Mr. Matthews: It is my understanding that they are not going to make further statements here but that they are going to have meetings in France at which they will discuss new arrangements with the leaders of the three Associated States.

General Bradley: If Navarre does not get 2 divisions from France, what will be the effect on Navarre’s Plan?

General O’Daniel: It will delay his plan for 6 months to a year.

General Collins: My impression is that we shouldn’t go on the assumption that anything really important is going to be done in a short time. We can say that the French Plan looks good on paper but we can’t really tell whether it will work until the French start doing something. So far the French really haven’t given it a try. The first thing they have to do is to get the divisions organized.

General O’Daniel: I think this operation they have just pulled off is a demonstration that Navarre means what he says and I think Navarre is sincere that he is going to try and do something. (At this point the meeting was restricted to the regular attendants at the regular State–JCS Meetings to talk with Secretary Wilson and the Chiefs about Korea.)

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]

1. This State Department draft was not cleared with the participants.
2. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, U.S. Army, relinquished command as Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, on July 11, 1953; he took office as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on Aug. 15, 1953.
3. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force since June 30, 1953.
4. Adm. Arthur W. Radford relinquished command as Commander in Chief, Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Fleet, on July 10, 1953; he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Aug. 15, 1953.
5. Vice Adm. Richard L. Conolly, President of the Naval War College.
6. See footnote 1, p. 616.
7. The suggested plan submitted to General Navarre was included in the report of the O’Daniel Mission, July 15, as Annex G. (711.5851G/7–1553)
8. Reference is to General O’Daniel’s telegram of June 30, p. 624.