7510.00/7–1653: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
201. Repeated information Saigon 27. Deptel 138, July 13 (Saigon 84).1 While we agree that Reynaud position goes farther in direction of seeking solution in Indochina through ending conflict than does Bidault, we do not believe that his major role in recent French policy decision was based on expectation that by paving way to broad revision Franco-Associated States basic accords he would give latter opportunity make such extreme demands that French public opinion would doubt continued mutuality of interests. Cambodian King had already, by his statements and actions prior to recent French policy statement, made extreme demands and his reply to French note July 3 may be equally extreme, but it hardly seems likely that a less liberal French policy decision re Franco-Cambodian relations would have reduced his intransigence. On the contrary, a harder policy might have blown lid off, if only because King had gone so far there was no turning back. Regardless of Reynaud’s views re ultimate solution Indochina conflict, we see no reason to doubt that he endeavored obtain French [Page 681] policy decision which would obtain maximum possible political benefit at this time both for France and Associated States Governments with consequent strengthening of political position of each in Indochina. Increased questioning by French public and parliamentary opinion as to value continuation Indochina effort was, we believe, both factor in decision to make broad concessions and likely to be increased by it.