751H.00/7–1053: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State
priority
146. Repeated information Saigon 22. Limit distribution. In discussing Indochina with Bidault, Department should bear in mind division of opinion in French Cabinet on substance and particularly that between Bidault and Reynaud. We are unable to assess extent to which this last difference is due to substance, how much to personal factors and how much to present uncertainty as to division of responsibility for Indochina between Bidault and Foreign Office on one hand, and Reynaud and former Ministry of Associated States on other. This difference is reflected in Offroy’s statement as reported in Embtel 144, July 10,1 and in unconfirmed reports that Bidault threatened to resign during recent Cabinet meeting over wording of communique on greater independence for Associated States. During conversation reported Embtel 97, July 7,2 Bidault spoke bitterly of Reynaud in general and of his views on Indochina is particular.
Some sources consider Bidault and his supporters as strongest partisans for continuation French effort Indochina and for French Union concept while Reynand group, which has probably played major part in recent policy decision re status Associated States, is pictured as more likely to favor some kind stepped up French effort Indochina as detrimental to French position in Europe. There are naturally shadings in all these schools of thought but it must be remembered that Reynaud has primary responsibility for Indochina and that he is close to Laniel.
The reference telegram read in part as follows:
“Offroy tells us that no important decisions re Indochina taken in Council of Ministers prior to Bidault’s departure and that decisions will be made after Bidault’s return from Washington in light of results of conversations, i.e., Bidault’s impressions and general effect of exchange of views and ideas of what can be done in Indochina. Offroy says that French Government does not anticipate detailed commitments from United States and United Kingdom of what they can do to assist in Indochina but that it does expect obtain some general idea of what can be done which will in turn influence French decision. Offroy also says Navarre’s plan still under study here and that to meet his needs fully would require use in some part of ‘contingents’, meaning legislative action by National Assembly. Consideration Navarre plan will also be affected by Washington talks. He further says Bidault is expected to bring up question of French Union with view to obtaining some statement that French Union is desirable and valuable concept and should be continued. He intimates that feeling here is that if French Union is of no value French have little reason for trying to preserve it in Indo-china.” (751G.00/7–1053)
↩- In telegram 97 from Paris, July 7, not printed, Ambassador Dillon reported that Bidault had showed him a telegram from the French High Commissioner in Cambodia which stated that one reason for the intransigence of the King was his belief that the United States would supply military and economic aid whether or not Cambodia broke with France. Bidault asked that the United States make it clear to the King that this was not the case. (751H.00/7–1053)↩