751G.00/6–1753: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
6512. Repeated Saigon 298. Labouisse and I had lunch today with Mendes-France. He talked freely about his policies and gave us a complete outline of his thoughts on Indochina. He feels that the present situation cannot continue and drastic action should only be taken with the concurrence of and after full discussion with the Western powers having interests in the area, including the United States and Great Britain.
[Page 611]The policy which he would propose would be to guarantee immediate and full independence to the Indochinese states. As an earnest of this decision, he would replace 200 to 300 leading colonial administrators with men from France having no previous experience in Indochina and who were pledged to carry out the new policy of full independence. Independence would also carry with it the offer of full authority in all districts where active fighting was not taking place and the immediate abolition of the maximum number of controls possible. Finally, the grant of independence would contain a definite time schedule for the withdrawal of French forces from Indochina. This schedule will be realistically arrived at based on the speed with which these forces can be replaced by Associated States troops.
As an example, Mendes-France used the following figures: Withdrawing 15,000 French troops at end of six months; increasing total to 30,000 at end of first year and 60,000 at end of second year, and probably completing withdrawal in three years. Shortly after this grant of independence had been made, the newly independent states and France would together propose an armistice to Ho Chi minh, subject to free nation-wide elections for a constituent assembly to establish a constitution for free and independent Vietnam. Mendes-France said that he had made many inquiries as to the results of an election if it were held under such circumstances, and his opinion was that the resulting Parliament would be divided between numerous parties, religious, social, etc. The Communist Party would, in all probability, be the largest, having approximately 25 to 30 percent of the Parliament. He thought that this was an acceptable risk. If Ho Chi minh should refuse an armistice on these terms, he felt the moral strengthening of the Vietnam cause would be so great that early victory might be possible.
He further stated that it was obviously the Communist policy to continue the war in Indochina for the purpose of weakening France and the Western alliance. While the Soviet peace offensive had been followed up by peaceful moves in practically every part of the world, there had been no sign of any such moves in Indochina. Obviously, this area is not included in the peace offensive. Conversely the Chinese and Soviets have taken care to give Ho Chi minh only enough arms to continue to sap the French strength and not enough to achieve a complete victory, which he felt would have been within the Communist capabilities if the USSR and China had desired to make the effort. He feels that Indochina can now be considered a Chinese sphere of influence from which the Soviets have withdrawn. He also feels that during Chou En-lai’s1 recent visit to Moscow, after which it was announced [Page 612] that the Soviets were staying in Manchuria, the Chinese received as a quid pro quo a free hand in South and Southeast Asia.
At the conclusion of our talk, he again stressed that the only alternative to a policy, such as he outlined, would be a political catastrophe in Indochina within the next year.2
- Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China.↩
- In telegram 2544 from Saigon, repeated for information to Paris as telegram 471, June 23, Ambassador Heath stated the following: “Is it possible that Mendes-France really believes that his proposals can do other than deliver Indochina to Communists in shortest possible time? Elections after an armistice would most certainly result in a popular-front type of government which would be merely precursor to a Communist state a la Czechoslovakia.” (751G.00/6–2353)↩