751G.00/5–2953: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1

secret

5892. Urtel 6184,2 rptd Saigon 281, London unnumbered. Concur with Embassies Paris and Saigon Indochina situation approaching critical point where important decisions by French seem called for and where US, because of large share of burden, increasingly entitled have its views heard and given effect. On other hand, Department convinced, as indicated by Embassy Paris, would be distinctly inadvisable for US Govt submit to French Government long list particulars covering points where we feel French action heretofore been nonexistent or insufficient or in wrong direction. Department has firmly resisted temptation to proceed in this manner. Our influence and pressure must be exerted so that French themselves will come up with and implement needed decisions in military, political and economic fields.

We should also help dispel any French illusion as to possibility a solution in Indochina may effortlessly and painlessly flow from some “general settlement in Far East”. Especially view current French military posture such eventuality too remote serve as basis for planning, yet believe this illusion has consciously or unconsciously blunted French military and political aggressiveness Indochina. Also hope we could influence top French political leadership retain firm grasp of fact French voluntary withdrawal from Indochina under present conditions inconceivable, aside from practical considerations, because would be (a) dishonorable abandonment those who have engaged lives and security on faith French promises (with US support) and (b) start inevitable chain reaction which would destroy France’s position as world power.

Agree with Embassy Paris regarding desirability early high level discussion with French regarding general aspects Indochina situation. See this connection final sentence Deptel 5655 rptd Saigon 2271.3 Believe forthcoming military mission to Indochina should define military situation and possibilities and should therefore raise certain politico-military issues which could be discussed in course proposed political talks. Amount US aid taken in conjunction with stationary political situation and deteriorating military situation make imperative early joint examination ways reversing current trends.

Believe Embassy’s views regarding preparations for proposed conversations sound. Believe political talks should not only follow formation new French Govt and disposition National Assembly debate on [Page 604] Indochina but also that they cannot usefully take place until after report proposed military mission has been received US Govt.

Dulles
  1. Drafted by Philip W. Bonsal, Director of PSA. Repeated for information to Saigon as telegram 2384 and to London by pouch.
  2. Dated May 29, p. 584.
  3. Dated May 18, p. 570.