Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/5–2053: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

secret

Saigon, May 20, 1953—7 p.m.
[Received 2:55 p.m.]

2256. Repeated information Paris 394, London 45, Singapore, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. We are approaching time of transition in IC when certain amount of stock taking might prove useful. Not only has there been an announced change in French political relationships with AS (new status of High Commissioners), but there will also within next fortnight be complete shift in military High Command. Furthermore advent monsoon brings lull in military operations until end of September. New and unexpected factor is unilateral devaluation IC piaster which has subjected whole framework AS union with France to unprecedented stress with possible result entirely new relationships will evolve between three states and protecting power. Finally problem of how to win war in IC will in next few weeks come before critical scrutiny in French National Assembly and US Congress.

It is obvious that despite continuing effort of seven years and material increase in Vietnamese native armed forces successful termination of war against Communist arms is still as far from sight as ever. This conclusion reached at time when our government is advocating an increased program of US aid for Indochina.

I. It is submitted that if Congress acts on this program certain military measures should be undertaken by both French and Vietnamese. These include:

(1) More audacious military leadership. French High Command should act, not react. Whole conduct of war has been founded on a Maginot-minded holding of “strong points” (sic)¹ leaving military initiative to enemy. Viet Minh should be fought in their own style, their coolie trains harried, their LOC destroyed, their deficiency in firepower made fatal lack.

(2) Greater impetus should be given to creation of a real Vietnamese army. In addition to 54 battalion program for 1953 this can be done by:

(A) Placing certain French Union elements, such as artillery, engineers, and communications under Vietnamese command. This should be possible particularly when south Vietnam (zone of communications) is entrusted to Vietnamese forces. Such a step would contribute greatly to morale of nascent Vietnamese army.

(B) Training of officers should be stepped up and as quickly as possible more officers of field grade should be brought forward. Training of specialists should receive equal emphasis. At present time there is only one general in whole Vietnamese army.

(C) Light and mobile character of proposed 54 commando battalions should be emphasized as Viet Minh must be matched by force of equal mobility and firepower capable of fighting in bush. Vietnamese demands for air force should be resisted in short term prospective, as their future pilots and ground crews can be trained by integration with FAF. Goal should be phasing of equipment and training which would result in a well-balanced national army at such time as war is won and French Union forces withdraw from Vietnam. However, there is already enough, if not too much, heavy hardware here which is practically useless off the highway.

(D) Provided training is adequate Vietnam militia and national guard forces should be given ample ammunition and weapons. Present system of doling out six cartridges per man and insufficient light arms for a platoon does not breed that form of courage which could stand up against better armed Viet Minh.

(E) In addition to building up field grade officers, there should be some top native leadership to which armed forces can rally. This is not now and never will be supplied by Bao Dai (see below).

(3) Improve French Union airlift capacity by indigenous means. In other words, bring more mechanics to man presently scheduled maintenance facilities so that aircraft could fly as many hours per month as in USAF. This would practically double airlift capacity of present number of aircraft in this theater. Our line of how this can be accomplished was set forth in Embtels 2186 and 2218.²

II. On political side, it is useless to win this war militarily if it is to be lost politically. Thus far most popular leader in Vietnam is Ho Chi-minh. Conceding that military victory can be won, unless there is a strong political framework in this country forces generated by Ho Chi-minh may still win final victory by political action. Chances of Communists in this regard have been greatly increased by recent action and inaction, such as devaluation measure and unskillful handling of King of Cambodia.

Following political measures are proposed:

(1) French and Associated States Government should issue a joint and unequivocal declaration of independence for the three Indochinese states with assurances of mutual support until war is won and after. US by appropriate statement should support this declaration. Although it is realized that French National Assembly may cavil at such a proposal, essence French plan for winning war by using native troops implies that these troops will be animated by some zeal to fight. Such zeal can only be generated if in fact Indochinese soldiers are fighting for real independence.

(2) There should be a long-range program of political indoctrination of Vietnamese army so that when “Victory Day“ comes there will be a body of well-trained troops loyal to regime.

(3) President Tam should be encouraged in his program of land reform and of elections for National Assembly. Unfortunately, land reform program has been much watered down as result of pressure from vested interests both Vietnamese and French. However, these two measures will give population sense of participation in nation’s destiny and will undercut Viet Minh propaganda.

(4) We should likewise sustain Governor Tri in his intelligent and valiant endeavor in Tonkin to develop an indigenous militia and fortified villages capable of resisting Viet Minh attack.

(5) As long-range project means should be found either to curb present unlimited powers of Bao Dai or (in my view preferably) to get rid of Bao Dai. At present time Vietnam is country without constitution. There is no document which gives Bao Dai sovereign powers, although they are expressed by inference in Baie d’Along agreements³ and he has usurped these powers with French support. If political and economic reform measures are to be taken, presidents of Vietnamese Government must not be subject to sudden deposition at whim of Bao Dai. At present Vietnam is an oriental despotism with French accent, Prime Minister being subject to caprice of the black market emperor and not to will of any National Assembly.

I have witnessed departure of two kings within past three years and have yet to see forebodings justified that abdication of these monarchs would spell ruin of country. Bao Dai is not Leopold, but unlike Farouk, who lost at gambling, he makes a fortune from it.

If Bao Dai should be retained, pressure should be exerted on him to permit holding national elections, creation of Constituent Assembly, and drafting by that assembly of constitution, which would make chief of state its servant and not vice versa. If Bao Dai does not assent to these measures he should be told to abdicate in favor of his son who should be brought back with the popular Queen to rule either directly or by regency and under constitution preferably not on French model. If this measure should not prove feasible, we should think in terms of Vietnamese federal republic free of French domination.

(6) Preparations should commence now for submission of Indochina conflict to UN jurisdiction. Once present lull in fighting season ends with monsoon, Viet Minh will recommence operations and may quite possibly reach Mekong thus renewing offensive against Laos and presenting a threat to security of Thailand. In consequence issues which were dodged by French in recent weeks will once more be presented to free world and should not be dodged again. There is, however, a period of some months in which to canvass this situation and to prepare resolute line of action.

III. In economic sphere there are several measures which can be taken:

(1) We should maintain our present MSA counterpart aid program with its emphasis on direct impact, support war effort, and increase in production. Once war is won, there will also be need in areas presently held by Viet Minh for large-scale humanitarian and rehabilitation projects. We should recognize that commodity and counterpart aid may be necessary in this country longer than in most areas.

(2) TCA type activities (e.g., in such fields as public administration) should be greatly expanded, preferably by French in view of difficulty recruiting French-speaking American technicians. If French unable to help, US or UN should be given clear authority to supply French-speaking technicians from any country.

(3) US support for French or Associated States budgets should be in proportion to contribution of such budgets to winning war by more imaginative and more vigorous measures than have thus far been adopted by either French or AS.

(4) Every effort should be made to stimulate, where appropriate, local production of both civil and military products and to persuade French concerns to encourage AS participation therein.

This desirable in order give middle class stake in nation’s economy.

(5) Utilization to fullest extent possible of US economic aid in order soften effects of devaluation.

(6) Associated States desire increased economic relations with other Asian countries, which should be fostered as longrun measure. This measure will run directly afoul vested French interests but is essential if in long run economies of these three kingdoms are to interlock usefully with economies of free nations of Asia. There should be more trade in both directions between IC and Japan, India, Philippines and Indonesia. Many French here still do not recognize that in expanding economy French business could also increase.

These conclusions are offered with all diffidence as they are based on only two months observation in IC. I accept entire responsibility for them but Bartlett and Trapnell concur in general with views set forth and particularly with recommendations in their respective fields.

McClintock

1. Parenthetical insertion in the source text.
2. Telegram 2186 from Saigon, May 13, concerned the possible utilization of Civil Air Transport aircraft. (751G.5/5–1353) Telegram 2218 of May 15 dealt with French Air Force maintenance capabilities. (751G.5/5–1553) Neither telegram is printed.
3. In the Baie d’Along Agreement of June 5, 1948, France recognized the independence of Vietnam within the French Union. For text, see France, Journal Officiel de la République Francaise, Lois et Decrets (Mar. 14, 1953), p. 2409. For an English translation, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. I, p. 117.