FE files, lot 55 D 388, “Indochina”
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Knight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)
Subject:
- Possible French Decision to Withdraw From Indochina
As you know, I have long felt that the continuation of the French effort in Indochina over a period of more than seven years is a combination of a miracle and of tacit conspiracy of silence in France. It has also been my opinion that, had the French foreseen initially that the struggle would be as long as it has been, they would not have undertaken it; likewise, should there occur events at any time which would place Indochina unfavorably over an appreciable period in the French headlines and in the French national consciousness, a decision to withdraw would probably result.
I have frequently compared the situation in France relating to Indochina to a liquid in which chemical parts (of vocal and latent opposition) were in suspension and which could instantaneously be precipitated by a sudden shock or catalyst.
It would seem that the situation as envisioned above is now developing. What with the Laotian invasion, rumors of trouble in Cambodia, successful Viet Minh operations in the Red River Delta, such as the recent coup at Kienan, Indochina has been in the headlines continuously for several weeks and has been forced into the French national consciousness. Barring a radical improvement in the local situation in Indochina, which none of the intelligence which we have received allows us to expect, it is all too likely that the psychological evolution is now taking place in France which could easily result in a decision to pull out, with the resulting loss of other parts of SEA. (I am, of course, fully aware that pulling out is not a simple matter in the case of a large expeditionary corps, particularly when added to the sizeable elements of the population which have cooperated with the French, etc., but I think we must assume that Ho Chi Minh would be all too willing to grant an armistice to permit this withdrawal, which would be the greatest Communist victory in Asia since Mao gained control of the Chinese mainland.)
For the above reasons, it is suggested that we consider additional aid to the French for Indochina as a top-urgent matter as being directly related to a French decision in the foreseeable future either to pull out or to continue the struggle in Indochina.
It is submitted that the time for painstaking analysis of the details of the Letourneau program has passed and has been entirely superseded [Page 535] by the Laotian and the possible impending Cambodian emergencies. This does not mean that we should immediately give the French the full amount requested by Letourneau, but we should make a substantial “advance payment” thereon thus making crystal and symbolically clear to the French Government and people that we stand staunchly by their sides in the face of this turn for the worse.
I believe that this recommended decision should be made virtually immediately if it is to influence favorably the French mental processes before they are too far advanced.
Obviously the above would be merely a stop-gap measure to prevent the worst from happening now through the setting in motion of a chain of events leading to the loss of most of SEA. It does not pretend to deal with the longer range elements needed to insure the possibility of an acceptable conclusion to the Indochina war. Among these elements are the political requirements to increase the sense of participation of the Associated States, to increase the local armies and to use the UN to best advantage.