Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 152

United States Minutes of United States-French Conversations, Second Session, at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, April 26, 1953, 3:30 p.m.¹

secret

Paris, April 26, 1953, 3:30 p.m.

[Extracts]

Present:

• French—MM. Bidault, Pleven, Bourges-Maunoury, Alphand and advisers.
• U.S.—Messrs. Dulles, Wilson, Humphrey, Stassen, Dillon, Draper, Merchant, Nash, Labouisse, and advisers.

Secretary Dulles opened the discussions by reading the memorandum dated April 26, 1953 on aid to the French Government prepared by the U.S. delegation.² He made copies of the memorandum available to the French delegation.

. . . . . . .

M. Bourges-Maunoury asked, with respect to paragraph 5 (c) of the U.S. memo,³ whether the additional Indochinese effort mentioned therein refers to the program for the additional National Army light battalions already planned.

Secretary Dulles replied that what we have in mind is the program for the increase in the National Armies forces that was discussed by Letourneau when the latter was in Washington recently. The U.S. military people are not, however, wholly satisfied with the French plans that were discussed on that occasion and might have some suggestions to make. The Secretary said that he would ask Mr. Nash to offer any observations he would like to make. The Secretary added that the program for Indochina must be one that can be defended before Congress on the basis of the testimony of our military people, and both the French and ourselves should urge our respective military people to appreciate each other’s points of view.

Mr. Nash said that he had participated in the talks with Letourneau in Washington, and that the Defense Department was pleased with the full and frank discussions at that time and with the information that had been furnished by the French, outlining a plan of action. The U.S. military had suggestions to offer regarding the French plan rather than criticisms. The principal point is the matter of tempo. The U.S. military thought that the plan might be accomplished in less than two years if more steam were put behind it. Mr. Nash also said that U.S. military had also called attention to the possible desirability of a more concerted effort in the north to cut the Viet-Minh supply lines. Mr. Nash added that it was not the position of the U.S. military that they could devise a better plan than the one the French had developed. However, the U.S. military would be happy to continue to offer any suggestions that they might have. He added that the plan the French laid out in Washington appears to hold promise of success. He also observed that Letourneau had been informed in Washington that the U.S. would undertake to furnish from FY 1953 funds the equipment needed for the additional light battalions. He referred to the fact that the U.S. military hoped the National Armies could be developed in units bigger than a battalion. He cited the U.S. experience in Korea, and said that as leadership for national units became available and such units were formed, they became more self-confident and effective.

. . . . . . .

Turning to Indochina, Pleven said that soon there would be a considerable change of military command affecting several generals. He wished to stress that no political meaning was to be attached to these changes. The fact is that the climate in Indochina is such that personnel must be rotated, and the generals affected by the forthcoming changes have served the normal tour of 28 months. Secondly, one should not conceal that Indochina places on France difficult and intricate problems. They have been fighting there for seven years. Whenever the economic and financial situation of France is discussed, everyone believes that the Indochina burden is at the root of many of the difficulties. The task of Mr. Letourneau is indeed a difficult one. Pleven also went on to speak of the growing importance of operations in Indochina. If more air transport facilities were available, new moves against Viet-Minh would be possible. It was necessary to appreciate all these matters and to have clear ideas about them, for if the additional effort in Indochina, to which the US had indicated a willingness to contribute a portion, were to require additional French outlays, then insoluble difficulties might be posed.

Pleven went on to say that as regards Indochina, he was struck by the US emphasis on National Armies. This had been a French idea for many years. The French want to use national troops in Indochina. The US experts should realize, however, that French experience has been that such troops are less likely to stand up to the test than others. It is also necessary to train such troops in modern methods, particularly aviation.

M. Bidault said that he had nothing to add to what Pleven had said regarding the burden of Indochina, except to say that the Indochina situation was difficult for some in France to understand. Some of those who want to build up Europe criticize the Government for keeping substantial forces in such a distant place. Others say that Indochina should be abandoned in order to reduce the very heavy French military expenditures. The Government is caught in a cross fire between some on the left who are opposed to the war and some on the right who wish to make economies. He said however the fight in Indochina would go on, with U.S. help and with help of the Associated States. It is the aim of France to build up these states.

. . . . . . .

… The Secretary [Dulles] continued that the prospective aid program presented to the French today may not do everything that some in France would like but that it represents a very considerable effort on our part. We must attempt to demonstrate to Congress this year the things the French are doing are important to the whole free world and to the U.S. The program must commend itself to the Congress and the American people. The program is an act of faith. Whether we can communicate this to the Congress and people depends in part on the French—on French plans and especially on the spirit shown in Indochina. A more positive and more dynamic effort in Indochina would be helpful. The Secretary said that Congress supports those who are accomplishing things. Whether the military program outlined for Indochina is feasible, he could not judge, but he would point out that a dynamic approach would make it easier to meet support. He concluded by reasserting our faith in the greatness of the future of France and our desire to help France over the present difficulties. He said he had all possible confidence that the French would make it a welcome task for us to cooperate with them.

1. This meeting dealt with overall aid to France and the proposed European Defense Community as well as with Indochina. The proceedings are further described in telegrams 5672, Apr. 26, and 5679, Apr. 27, from Paris; for texts, see volume V.
2. The text of the memorandum is contained in telegram 5673 from Paris, Apr. 26; for text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1915–1967, Book 9, pp. 34–36. The memorandum set forth the dimensions of aid to France contemplated by the United States for fiscal year 1954, including assistance in support of the French effort in Indochina. For documentation on this aid program, see volume vi.
3. The text of paragraph 5(c) of the memorandum as contained in telegram 5673 from Paris, Apr. 26, read as follows: “Subject further to the adoption by the Fr govt of a satisfactory military program which in all its aspects holds the promise of success in I–C, the US is prepared to provide a portion of a mutually agreed additional Fr effort in I–C, involving especially additional trained forces of the Assoc States. This portion would be of a moderate amount of dollars and subject to specific subsequent agreement before it is to be considered a commitment.” (United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 35–36)