PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Bonsal Memoranda”
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Counselor (MacArthur)
Subject:
- Prospects in Indochina
I understand that, at the time of the Mayer conversations, it was decided that we would not raise with the French the desirability of adding more troops from France or North Africa to the French Union forces in Indochina nor did we even consider raising the possibility that the French might send French conscripts to Indochina as we are sending draftees to Korea.
As a result, we are engaged in evaluating and will eventually support (there is now no alternative) a French plan or strategic concept for obtaining decisive military results in Indochina on the basis of securing the additional combat-worthy, mobile, heavily armed troops required by the French High Command through the raising, arming and training of light, “commando” native levies who will relieve heavier trained units from static defense and territorial security duties and make them available as a part of the essential strategic reserves needed by the French High Command to embark upon decisive operations. Such operations, are, under the French plan, contemplated in early 1955.
I am incompetent, obviously to pass upon the reasons for the decision set forth in the first paragraph. I can only assume it to be based upon a sound appraisal of the French political situation and of NATO requirements. I believe, however, that the decision greatly lengthens the odds on a possible favorable solution in Indochina. My reasons are as follows:
- (a)
- The French plan, based on native levies and no reinforcements from abroad, calls for no serious attempt to bring the enemy organized forces (eight divisions) to a decisive battle before early 1955, i.e., those forces will continue to have relative freedom of action for the next two years.
- (b)
- Although the French gave us the impression in the summer and early fall of 1952 that the 1952–1953 fighting season would prove favorable to them, the enemy has had the initiative throughout, he has seized the Thai country and he is now invading Laos. (On the other hand, Hanoi has not been threatened.)
- (c)
- Although the French won a brilliant defensive victory at Nasan last December, the fact is that the mobile reserves available to the French High Command are today, as a result of enemy initiatives, perhaps as much as 50% less than they were in October 1952, whereas the enemy’s power of movement seems in no way impaired. (A few additional battalions could have made all the difference to the French last fall.)
- (d)
- Current prospects seem to be in the direction of increased enemy initiative; French possibilities of reaction should, of course, not be discounted but, as stated above, the reserves are very thin and, for the present, getting thinner.
- (e)
- What are the prospects of raising reliable, enthusiastic native troops on our side when the enemy army of native troops is achieving an uninterrupted series of rather dramatic advances? Who will the arms the French and we are furnishing eventually be used against?
- (f)
- French ineptitude and the deteriorating military situation are counteracting progress earlier made in the political field.
- (g)
- In view of the above, is not our side becoming increasingly vulnerable to a phony peace or armistice offer which, if accepted—and it would have great appeal for war-weary French and natives alike—would in effect turn the area over to a Communist dominated government resting for its power upon the eight undefeated divisions of the Viet Minh.
I do not say that the French strategic plan or concept cannot succeed. Nor do I think we have any choice other than to support it and, by the promptness and efficacy of our support, to increase its chances of success. But I think those chances are slim indeed both absolutely and as compared with the chances that would be ours if we could increase the French Union forces in the Tonkin Delta area by two divisions (or more) as of the beginning of the next fighting season (October 1953). And I think it regrettable, if Indochina and Southeast Asia mean what I have been told they mean to the free world, that it should be necessary to fight this crucial battle with such modest means from outside the area (70,000 Frenchmen; 20,000 Legionnaires; 40,000 Africans including an air force of only 10,000 men with antiquated, undermanned equipment). Nothing, in my judgment would accelerate the alleged Communist peace offensive more than a clear indication of the West’s determination and ability to win the war in Indochina; such indications are lacking at present.