751G.5/4–1353: Despatch
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State1
No. 441
Subject:
- Conversation between Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army in the Pacific and French Senior Military Officers.
On April 4 the reporting officer attended a dinner tendered by Col. Emons B. Whisner, Acting Chief of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), in honor of Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army in the Pacific, who had come from his headquarters at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, to Indochina for a visit of several days to discuss military matters. Other persons present at the dinner were Gen. Salan, Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina; Gen. Bondis, Commander of the French Union Forces in South Vietnam; Admiral Auboyneau, Commander-in-Chief of the French Naval Forces, Far East; Col. Lucas, French Liaison Officer assigned to MAAG; and Col. Moore of Joint Staft CINCPAC. Following dinner Gen. O’Daniel discussed with his French colleagues several aspects of the war in Indochina.
Gen. O’Daniel appeared to be most interested in the question of maintaining security in areas from which the Viet Minh had been swept by Franco-Vietnamese military operations. He questioned Generals Salan and Bondis closely regarding the reason why, after an area had been presumably cleared of the enemy, the security of such an area could not be entrusted to “the police” and regular troops relieved from security duties. The French Generals explained that the nature of the warfare in Indochina was such that the enemy was able to blend in with the local population and exact from them by terrorism a large measure of cooperation. In the face of superior forces the enemy faded away only to return when such forces were no longer present. Consequently the presence of troops was necessary to ensure security. The Vietnamese security organizations were not yet competent to deal with this problem. Gen. O’Daniel returned several times to this question. He seemed not to be convinced completely by the explanations given to him and several times rephrased his questions, as if to make sure that he had made himself clear to the French generals. He cited American experience in Korea; he suggested that by starting in the South and progressively clearing areas as Franco-Vietnamese forces moved northwards it could be reasonably assumed that all strong enemy elements had been done away with in the area swept over and that the police or Vietnamese militia should be sufficient to take [Page 466] care of any infiltration. The impression derived by the reporting officer was that Gen. O’Daniel was particularly concerned with emphasizing the importance attached by him, and presumably the United States higher command, to the freeing of the maximum number possible of experienced soldiers from police duties for combat and that he was suggesting obliquely the greater utilization of Vietnamese police or second-line troops for security duties. The French replies were in themselves reasonable and presumably accurate so far as they went, but they did seem to gloss over one very important aspect of the matter—the fact that there is a lack of confidence by the French High Command in both the ability and reliability of Vietnamese effectively to insure security. The considerable discussion of the problem of rear-area security appeared to have given Gen. O’Daniel a better appreciation of the type of warfare in Indochina and to have cleared up a number of points regarding the deployment of French and Vietnamese forces on which he appeared to have been hazy. The reporting officer believes, however, that Gen. O’Daniel retained doubts as to the soundness of French pacification tactics and the correctness of the assumptions and reasoning of his French colleagues.
In discussing the role to be played by the 54 Vietnamese National Army commando battalions to be created, Col. Whisner inquired whether it was envisaged that these battalions would be lightly armed and equipped and would operate against the Viet Minh in guerrilla fashion, infiltrating Viet Minh zones and in general using offensive tactics similar to those employed by the Viet Minh. Gen. Salan indicated that it was the intention of the French High Command to use the 54 battalions to maintain security in the rear areas, for instance within the Tonkin Delta—offensively in the sense that they would constantly be conducting operations against Viet Minh-held or infiltrated areas, but not against Viet Minh bases outside the Delta. To a question whether it was contemplated that the light battalions would have coolie trains to carry their armament and equipment and thus give them greater mobility, Gen. Salan remarked that Viet Minh prisoners of war were used as pack coolies, and that in effect it had not been found necessary to develop Vietnamese service organizations for packing purposes.
Gen. O’Daniel also had a long discussion regarding the necessity of organizing the Franco-Vietnamese forces into regiments and divisions. He contended that the present battalion organization of the forces in Indochina was essentially a weak organization. To impress the enemy with the strength of the Franco-Vietnamese forces these forces should be used as divisions. The French officers asserted that in larger operations troops were actually used tactically as regimental combat teams and sometimes divisions but countered with arguments regarding the difficulties of organizing their present forces along regimental [Page 467] and divisional lines. The Vietnamese lacked staff officers and could not operate divisional or even regimental staffs. The diversity of types of troops in Indochina—Moroccans, Senegalese, Legionnaires, Vietnamese—precluded the development of regiments. As Gen. Bondis put it, it would be relatively inefficient to have a regiment of Senegalese; he would prefer to have a battalion of Senegalese, a battalion of Legionnaires and a battalion of Moroccans, each being suitable for particular types of operations. The Legionnaires could be relied on when positions had to be held, the Moroccans were better at infiltration, etc.
Gen. O’Daniel urged the more rapid formation of Vietnamese officers, saying that although it might not be possible to turn out quickly Vietnamese majors, colonels and even generals equal to French officers of that grade, it had been found in Korea that youthful Korean commanders of relatively little experience were performing passably in those positions. He stressed that time was of the essence and that it was necessary to make do with the material at hand. If officers now commanding companies were given battalion and even regimental command, he wagered some could probably do a competent job, after a period of field experience with a French advisor. The French explained the difficulty of getting Vietnamese officers. Gen. Salan cited the case of a school being conducted at Hanoi to develop field-grade officers. The Vietnamese had been requested to supply 50 officers. Only 22 had reported to the school. The Vietnamese Army had explained that this was all that could be spared, such was the shortage of officers to man units now in the field. Gen. Salan also mentioned the reluctance of Vietnamese officers to see lateral entry into the army of Vietnamese who by background and education could handle staff or technical functions. The explanations of the French officers made it evident that quite apart from the purely military difficulties entailed in the creation of command and staff officers, there were a multiplicity of cross currents arising from political and psychological factors which have served to hamper direct and dynamic action.
The evening ended on the note, struck by Gen. O’Daniel, that he had come to Indochina to see what he and his headquarters could do to be of assistance. His sharp questions and the arguments presented by him had been in the spirit of friendship and for the purpose of informing himself. He hoped that his French colleagues would not take amiss certain views which he had expressed frankly and vigorously. The French officers appeared to reciprocate the sentiments expressed by Gen. O’Daniel. As the reporting officer was leaving, Col. Whisner remarked to him that he had felt the evening to be very profitable, for seldom had he seen Gen. Salan, who is normally reserved and cautious, become so engrossed in a conversation and express himself so freely.
I believe that Gen. O’Daniel conceives of the war in Indochina [Page 468] largely in terms of the war in Korea. The French on the other hand tend to emphasize the differences between the situation here and in Korea and return to the point time and again that the French Command is not in a position to institute a program on as elaborate and lavish a scale as it appears possible for the United States to do in Korea.
Through the courtesy of the Embassy’s Army Attaché, we have seen Gen. O’Daniel’s Top Secret telegraphic report to Admiral Radford (OAEMA Saigon MC–69–53),2 which reinforces the opinions described above with a pungency which justifies Gen. O’Daniel’s sobriquet of “Iron Mike.” Without entering into discussion as to the merits of divisional versus battalion organization to meet the peculiar requirements of the war in Indochina, I do desire to stress that Gen. O’Daniel’s suggestion that the new Vietnamese battalions to be called up this year be placed under French commanders will by no means suit the psychological requirements of this war. One of the sore points at issue in the endeavor to recruit 54 new light Vietnamese battalions has been the sensitivity of the relatively untried Vietnamese General Staff to being forever under French tactical and strategical control. The Embassy believes that the pattern so successfully adopted in Korea—of forming ROK divisions with native commanders—should be given a thorough trial in Indochina.