Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G. 00/3–3153

Memorandum by Ambassador Donald R. Heath to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

top secret

[Washington,] March 31, 1953.

Subject:

• Attached Memorandum

Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense, has asked me to submit for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my opinion, herewith attached, on the political effects and feasibility of the strategic operations plan for Indochina outlined by M. Letourneau, French Minister for the Associated States, in his conferences at the Pentagon. It is understood that Brigadier General Trapnell, Chief of MAAG, Indochina, is to prepare a military appreciation of the plan¹

If you approve, I recommend the attached opinion be passed to Mr. Nash, for further transmittal to the JCS.²

[Annex]

Memorandum by Ambassador Donald R. Heath

top secret

[Washington, March 31, 1953.]

The French plan of operations, explained by Minister Letourneau at the Pentagon, is designed to accomplish decisive military defeat of the Viet Minh forces by early 1955. The plan envisages doubling the present strength of the Vietnamese National Army and gradually entrusting to it autonomous military responsibilities in operations and in occupying and controlling areas now controlled in whole, or in part, by the Viet Minh forces. If successful, this plan should also progressively strengthen the political position of the Bao Dai government. It would be still better for the political situation if the time-table of military expansion and operations could be accelerated, but the French insist that this is not practicable.

The plan, for example, contemplates that final operations to clean out the South will be accomplished not by French forces, but by the Vietnamese national army, under direct command of Vietnamese officers and that these purely Vietnamese units will remain for the military occupation of the region.

Up to the present time, the Viet Minh propaganda machine has made great capital out of the fact that it is French troops or French commanded Vietnamese units who are doing the fighting and occupying Vietnamese territory for the alleged purpose of restoring colonial control. This propaganda advantage should be lost when the Vietnamese troops finally conquer and control the important southern region with the French out of the picture.

The South is the most productive part of Viet-Nam and, when finally cleared of the Viet Minh should produce large rice exports with increased tax revenues which should increase the prestige and capabilities of the Vietnamese administration.

Under the French plan, the Vietnamese national army will also occupy the populous northern delta, but will be unable to do this without French military assistance or before another eighteen months. When the national army is able unaided to occupy and control the northern delta, Vietnamese Governmental prestige and authority should be still further enhanced.

Under the Letourneau plan, the Vietnamese Army will be increased by the Spring of 1955 to some 300,000 men as compared with a French Union expeditionary force of around 150,000. This disproportion of forces should allay present fears entertained by certain Vietnamese Nationalists and fanned by Viet Minh propaganda that after defeating the Viet Minh the French expeditionary force will try to resume military control of Viet-Nam.

It is my considered view that the Franco–Vietnamese program of expansion of the Vietnamese National Army and progressive increase of its independent military responsibilities is politically feasible and desirable.

1. Infra.

2. The following handwritten notations appear in order on the source text:

   “Don: This seems fine to me. I’m asking Walter to look it over too as he heard Letourneau’s presentation and I did not. J[ohn] M. A[llison]”

   “Don—I did not realize that Letourneau predicted decisive defeat by 1955, but rather that proposed plan should put Vietnamese–French forces in military command of situation. However, you know so well French views, I probably misunderstood—W [alter] S. R[obertson]”

   “Mr. Bonsal, Mr. Letourneau said his plan contemplates reduction of Viet Minh resistance to negligible proportions by early 1955. I accordingly think my phrase ‘decisive defeat’ might stand. D[onald] R. H[eath]”

   “I agree. P[hilip] W. B[onsal]”

   On Apr. 3, Assistant Secretary of State Allison transmitted a copy of Ambassador Heath’s memorandum to Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash. Allison’s letter of transmittal read as follows: “Attached is a memorandum prepared by Ambassador Heath, in accordance with your request, giving the Ambassador’s views as to the political effects and feasibility of the strategic operations plan of concept for Indochina outlined to us by M. Letourneau. We are in general agreement with the Ambassador’s views. We are working on a more detailed analysis of the French plan and will let you have our thinking on this subject at an early date.” (751G.5/4–353)