751G.00/3–453: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1725. Repeated Paris unnumbered, Hanoi unnumbered. I went with General Trapnell to see Marshal Juin who returned yesterday from his Korean trip and three days in Tonkin.1 I have very much decided impression that Juin is far less interested in an early victorious termination of IC hostilities than he is in build-up of French metropolitan forces. He said it is quite obvious that if Vietnam can with outside (American) help increase its forces by 40,000 men this year and another 40,000 next year that during November 1953–April 1954 campaign season, Franco-Vietnamese forces can possibly deal decisive blows to Viet Minh. He is not sure this will happen. He volunteered that it was impossible for France to withdraw substantially from its IC war. France was committed and had to go through with it but his attitude toward this commitment is expressed by a statement that if he [Page 398] had French officers corps (cadres) now assigned in IC back in France he could readily create 10 additional metropolitan divisions.
He paid tribute to magnificent effort of training ROK divisions in Korea. He was impressed by one camp where 70,000 were receiving military training. It was a phenomena like Ford Willow Run plant. He did not see, however, that UN troops could achieve a local victory in Korea with [without] much greater strength and facilities than they now have.
In IC important factor is whether or not Vietnamese could recruit or train 40,000 additional troops this year and with them succeed in cleaning out northern delta. If they could relieve the French Union troops now tied down in delta the latter could add to the striking force against major units in Viet Minh. Even more important Viet Minh would not be able to recruit replacements and additions from delta and in that situation could not hope to stand against the French expeditionary force plus the Vietnamese heavy battalions unless China entered as an overt belligerent.
He was somewhat worried (Letourneau expressed same anxiety) lest Chinese should by-pass strongly held Tonkin and attack Thailand and/or Burma. Both countries were a military “zero”. In Thailand and in Burma the Commies had used local parties and forces as a spearhead and a mask. In Burma they would have excuse of attacking with Chinese Nationalist troops in north.
- Marshal Alphonse Juin, Commander of Allied Land Forces in Central Europe and Inspector General of French Armed Forces, visited Indochina from Feb. 15 to 18, and from Mar. 1 to 6 to obtain information on the military situation and the needs of French and Vietnamese forces. During the intervening period, he visited Korea at the invitation of the United States to examine training procedures.↩