Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/1–2853

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] January 28, 1953.

Subject:

• Discussion of Indochina Situation with M. Mayer and M. Letourneau in Course of Secretary’s Forthcoming Trip.²

Background of Recent United States–French Discussions

On December 18 last year Secretary Acheson met with Messrs. Schuman, Letourneau and Eden. M. Letourneau discussed the situation in Indochina and, after describing in general terms current plans to increase the projected number of native troops in Viet Nam, concluded that it would be necessary for France to call upon the United States for further assistance in equipping and financing these units. The Secretary replied that he could, of course, make no commitment but that he felt that it would be most useful to initiate working-level discussions of the situation in order to assemble a factual base for the making of future decisions. The Secretary proposed a group with representatives from State, Defense and DMS. Secretary Acheson emphasized the gaps in our knowledge of the situation. (Here he referred not so much to factual intelligence as to the lack of any exchange of views as to military operations in relation to plans; for example, what was the French plan for the current fighting season and how have those operations compared with forecasts earlier in the year?)

Messrs. Schuman and Letourneau thought well of the Secretary’s proposal. Two days later, however, the French Government fell. The Department heard nothing from the French until about January 5 and it was not until January 15 that a definite message from M. Letourneau arrived to the effect that he expected to return to Saigon at the end of January and would be prepared to receive the proposed working level group early in February.³

Meanwhile because of Ambassador Dunn’s views to the general effect that the new French Government would not be in a position to conduct useful discussions regarding Indochina prior to M. Mayer’s proposed visit to the United States in February or March and also because of the imminence of the date for a change of administration, the Department developed reservations as to the desirability of the proposed talks, at least at this time. Consequently, when the French Embassy on January 15 delivered the message from Letourneau described above, the reply given was to the effect that while it was assumed the new administration would favor the principle of a thorough examination of all factors relevant to the Indochina situation, it was believed that that administration would wish to reach its own conclusions as to the scope and timing of any conversations and as to the composition of the United States delegation. It was left that the Department would keep the French Embassy informed of developments.

Recommendations

On the basis that the Secretary’s current trip to Europe is of a purely fact-finding nature and that he will not wish to make commitments, the following recommendations in relation to any discussion of the Indochina problem are submitted:

1. The Secretary will wish to stress the importance attached by the United States to the magnificent resistance to Communist aggression being conducted by the Franco-Vietnamese troops in Indochina. It is important that this point be stressed and that if possible the Secretary be in a position to say that the President is fully aware of the efforts being made there.

2. It will not be possible to make any commitment with regard to the probable volume of U.S. aid for Indochina in fiscal 1954. For a discussion of the situation as regards fiscal 1953, reference is made to the French briefing memorandum prepared for the Secretary.⁴

3. M. Mayer and M. Letourneau will raise the question of the working level conversations suggested by Secretary Acheson. In reply, the Secretary will presumably wish to state his agreement with the desirability of assembling a current agreed picture of the situation and prospects. If a visit to this country by M. Mayer appears imminent, the Secretary might suggest that M. Letourneau accompany the Prime Minister and that the party also include high level military and economic experts so as to permit a full review. The Secretary may wish to indicate to M. Mayer a considerable urgency with regard to the reaching of an agreed French-United States view regarding the situation and prospects in Indochina. He should stress the point that whatever decisions we reach should if at all possible be translated into an increase in our capabilities by October 1, 1953 which is the date when the new fighting season begins. He should stress that what we wish to achieve is an agreed view as to the capabilities which would be required in order to ensure progress on the military and political fronts.

4. It might be made clear to M. Mayer that we would like to be taken further into the confidence of the French Government in the matter of the conduct of military and political operations in Indochina. The Secretary should state that while we do receive a great flow of intelligence at the operating level and while we are very pleased with the cooperation received from representatives of the French Government in Indochina, the fact is that with regard to planning and the degree to which actual operations measure up to or fall below plans, we feel we are more or less in the dark.

5. The Secretary might indicate that we and the French have somewhat similar problems in Korea and in Indochina so far as the training of native troops is concerned. He might suggest, without making any commitment, that an exchange of training missions might result in the pooling of information and consequently in mutual benefit. He might offer to explore the possibility of our sending to Indochina a mission consisting of a number of US and ROK officers who would acquaint themselves with what the major French military training mission is doing there. Simultaneously a mission consisting of French and Vietnamese (plus possibly a Cambodian and a Laotian officer) might proceed to Korea on a similar mission. The Secretary probably cannot make a commitment on this point pending a full discussion with the Pentagon but it might be helpful to obtain the reaction of Messrs. Mayer and Letourneau at the political level.

6. The Secretary will wish to explore in the most tactful and non-commital manner whether there is any possibility of inducing the French to increase the number of combat-worthy, non-native troops in Indochina. It is quite evident that under present conditions there is a distinct shortage of combat-worthy reserves and it should be equally evident that this shortage will not be supplied, directly at least, by such added native troops as can be made available. The French have never sent conscripts to Indochina. In order to do so, the French Assembly would have to pass enabling legislation. This would be most difficult. Nevertheless, the fact that we are sending conscripts to Korea gives us a right to explore this question with the French. It is possible that what the French were unable to do in the framework of a “colonial war” they might be able to do in the framework of a free world struggle against aggression not only in Indochina but in the Far East as a whole. This is a matter which requires the most delicate handling.

7. The Secretary might wish to discuss with Messrs. Mayer and Letourneau the current political situation in Viet Nam. He may wish to refer to Bao Dai’s apathy and to Prime Minister Tam’s great difficulty in securing able associates in spite of the qualities of courage and imagination which Tam, himself has displayed. The Secretary may wish to explore the question of how far Tam’s difficulties arise from lack of confidence on the part of the Vietnamese people as to France’s eventual intentions. The Secretary should, of course, show an awareness of the degree to which the attributes of sovereignty have been transferred to the Vietnamese Government and of the possibility that any further French statements or concessions would be interpreted at the present time as signs of weakness. He may wish to inquire whether there would be any possibility of improving the political situation in Viet Nam through a bipartite (US–France) or tripartite (US–UK–France) statement to the general effect that once the Communist aggression is defeated in Viet Nam the people of that country will be entirely free to determine both their form of government and their relationship to other countries. (Various French officials including members of Letourneau’s staff have done considerable work on a possible tripartite statement on Southeast Asia; this idea will consequently not be entirely new to the French.)

1. Drafted by Philip W. Bonsal, Director of PSA.

2. From Jan. 31 to Feb. 8, 1953, Secretary Dulles and Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security, visited seven Western European nations including France to confer with allied leaders on problems of common concern, particularly the proposed European Defense Community. For documentation on the trip, see volume v.

   A marginal notation on the source text of this memorandum indicates that the Secretary of State did not see the paper prior to his departure for Europe. However, a copy had been given to Counselor Douglas MacArthur II, to show to the Secretary during the trip. The notation added that the paper had not been coordinated or cleared with the Bureau of European Affairs.

3. The French Government accepted the proposal for the convening of a working group in an aide-mémoire from the French Embassy to the Department of State, Jan. 5, 1953, not printed. (751G.5 MSP/1–553) The information received from the French Embassy on Jan. 15 was relayed by Bonsal to Allison in a memorandum of the same day, not printed. (751G.00/1–1553)
4. The undated briefing paper on France prepared for the Dulles-Stassen trip is not printed. Annex 2 is titled “US Aid to France, Background and Problems.” (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 136)