751G. 5/1–1953: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon ( Heath ) to the Department of State
1418. Rptd info Paris 212, Hanoi unnumbered. General Alessandri, Bao Dai’s military adviser and in 1950 French commander of the north, came to see me yesterday to say that there was now general [Page 353] agreement in Paris, in the French command here and on the Viet side as to the necessity increasing Viet National Army by some 41,000 men or 65 light battalions of 640 men each. There should be little difficulty as regards armament, French reserves and expected supplies of small arms, ammunition and motor transport are believed sufficient to equip initially the new light battalions.
The difficulties were in the financing and in Bao Dai’s insistence on greater Viet military responsibility and participation in military planning. The problem of financing the greater Viet responsibility could be settled. Alessandri did not have final figures for the cost of 41,000 additional troops but he thought it would not differ greatly from previous estimates of 22 billion francs annually for pay, maintenance and construction and 12 billion francs for initial armament. The French naturally insisted that Viet Government make a greater fiscal effort. This was a legitimate demand.
Hinh’s presumed demands in Paris for immediate large extension of Viet military authority and responsibility were excessive. The fact was Viet National Army did not yet have sufficient number of officers capable exercising higher command. But with good will an acceptable compromise could be worked out on this point.
But wrangles over financing and greater military authority for Viet forces should not, Alessandri insisted, be allowed to delay agreement and decision to increase the national army. The fall of the Pinay government had already delayed decision. There was not much more time to be lost. The 65 light battalions must be substantially ready by October next. Final decisions and plans should be agreed upon by end of month.
With these additional forces in Tonkin Alessandri felt sure that Franco-Viet forces could by October next begin decisively to cut down Viet Minh forces. Alessandri had just returned from north where he spoke with Tri, province chiefs, Nationalists and French and Viet officers. He said there was general agreement that time was ripe for successful effort against Viet Minh. The peasants in delta hated the Viet Minh but had as yet no belief in Bao Dai. What they wanted was peace and freedom and with better administration from Tri’s government and effective use of Viet troops they would rally to Bao Dai’s standard. The morale of the Viet Minh while presently good would not hold up, Alessandri thought, against really successful Franco-Viet operations. There would be a chain reaction of defections to Bao Dai’s side.
He thought there was no hope of any major decisive victories in the north before October. There was something, however, to be done in [Page 354] south. Colonel Le Roy 1 had told him that with eight extra battalions, he could clean out so-called old provinces. Given authority and funds, Le Roy said he could recruit, organize, officer and train eight light battalions in four month’s time and could clean out that region fairly shortly thereafter. After that operation the eight battalions could be sent as a part of the 65 battalions to the north since it was only in north that war against Viet Minh could be won decisively.
Alessandri insisted again there was no time to be lost in starting these five battalions. It would be useful if US could make representations to that effect at the highest levels to Paris. While there was agreement in principle in Paris as to necessity of increasing national army, there was not the proper sense of the urgency of the matter.
- Col. Jeau Leroy, a French officer engaged in the organization of Vietnamese militia units. For his account of the war in Indochina, see Jean Leroy, Un homme dans la rizière (Paris, Editions de Paris, 1955).↩