751G.00/1–1253
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)1
Subject:
- Discussion of Indochina by French-US Working Group
We have read with interest the excellent memo which you drafted and which was sent to Mr. Matthews from Mr. Allison on the subject of the agenda for the projected US—French Working Group on Indochina,2 and have the following comments to make as of possible interest.
[Page 349]In the discussion section we concur with the thought that the French cannot continue the present level of their effort indefinitely, and we believe that the stated French position on this point appears reasonable. Insofar as the statement that the French “want more help without diminution of their responsibility” is concerned, we do not take issue with this conclusion but, on the other hand, do not know of much evidence to back it up.
With regard to eventual French plans, especially in the budgetary field, we note that reference is made to a statement in Saigon by French Secretary of State for Army deChevigné to the Vietnamese to the effect that 1953 is the last year France can maintain its military support at the present level. We believe it should be pointed out that no other French official has confirmed this remark, which may have been made in Indochina for the purpose of stirring up the local government to get started on its own military programs. Furthermore we do not concur in the statement that the French planning is predicated on an assumption that the Vietnamese will be able to cope with the enemy within “a definite if unstated period.” It is true that French appropriations for 1953 are reduced by 5.5% over 1952 (principally because in 1952 there were certain extraordinary payments involved which will not recur in 1953) and that a further slight decrease for 1954 can be envisaged but this certainly does not indicate a French belief that a complete turnover to the Vietnamese in the military field is possible within a given period. On the other hand, our belief, based on statements which have been made to us by the French, is that they consider possibly, or at least hope, they may be able to withdraw an important percentage of their ground forces within a given period, but they appear to realize that some ground, and considerable air support, plus a major training effort will be needed almost indefinitely.
We fully agree with the conclusions of the memorandum that events since October have certainly not increased optimism as to the likelihood of any military solution under present conditions. Furthermore we believe that if the present level of effort were increased, a similar increase would doubtless be effected on the opposing side, thus causing more and more of the Western effort to be committed in Indochina still without obtaining a settlement. We likewise agree with the conclusions as to the situation with which we are confronted, including the strong likelihood of an early French appeal for additional aid, possibly based on the fact that the decisions of the Letourneau talks in Washington in June, as they were understood by the French, have not been fully implemented.
Passing to the section of the memorandum giving recommendations, we concur with the listed military objectives except those numbered 5) and 6). The first of these recommendations envisages the sending of French conscripts to Indochina. We believe this is an impractical [Page 350] objective for various reasons. In the first place it would require action by the National Assembly to authorize the sending of draftees to Indochina, and the result would be to convert the present campaign into a French “national war.” We believe the Assembly would not only refuse to take action declaring a national war, but that an attempt to get parliamentary action in this sense would jeopardize Assembly support for the present French effort, and would in all likelihood lead to a public outcry, which has thus far been avoided, demanding French withdrawal from the Far East and concentration of French Union forces in Europe and North Africa. This is a concept which is very widespread in France, and never far below the surface. However, we believe that to have this thought debated in parliament would be most unfortunate especially in view of the strong support it would probably obtain. Therefore, given our present policy of maintaining the French in Indochina, we believe that to suggest the conscript issue to them would be to endanger our own long-term interests.
Insofar as paragraph 6) is concerned, we are opposed to the suggestion to the French that they increase French Union forces in Indochina. Any such increase would be at the expense of French troops in Europe, where the French already consider themselves dangerously under-strength, and in North Africa. A suggestion in this sense would be open to the same objections as in trying to get French conscripts to Indochina, in that it would give the French an opportunity, which we desire to avoid, to reopen the entire question of whether they can remain in the Far East at all. Since public opinion is so opposed to this campaign, because of its drain on French human and material resources, it is believed that any suggestion to French authorities they increase their forces in the area would have unfortunate repercussions on our relations with them, and, if leaked to the press, would cause an anti-American outcry in France, coupled with a demand for French withdrawal from Indochina.
Under Section (b) Political, of Recommendations, we are in general agreement with most of the points though under 2) we note that it is suggested that the United States ask for an increase in the total effort by France to accompany any increase in US aid. While this is of course desirable, we fear that realistically the best we can hope from an increase in our participation, is that the French effort will remain constant. The US would then bear an increased percentage of the burden, a result which is of course unsatisfactory but, we are afraid, is inevitable.
Under paragraph 3) of the Political section, we would not oppose a tripartite statement along the lines envisaged, and believe it would be encouraging to the Vietnamese, nor would we favor any additional French unilateral declarations, though we do not believe they would necessarily generally be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
[Page 351]Under Section (c) Economic, we believe that, in addition to the points listed, an effort should be made to study with the French the problem of the franc-piaster exchange rate, and of exchange rates in Indochina in general. The MSA has sent Mr. McDiarmid to Saigon to prepare a report on this subject, which we assume will be available fairly soon. There is also the long-term problem, which might at least be raised by the Working Group, of studying the eventual capabilities of the Vietnamese economy to support a national army. We do not believe that a study of this subject has been made for Vietnam, or the other Associated States, and it will certainly sooner or later represent an important field in which we will require information.
Finally, under the paragraph on the location of the talks, we note that the French in their reply accepting the formula of a working group have proposed that the talks be held in Saigon, while the memorandum to Mr. Matthews states they should be held in Paris. In this connection the Secretary remarked to Ambassador Bonnet that the talks should be held wherever M. Letourneau might be, since personal consultation with him was a prerequisite to their success. We believe this point will require further discussion when the plans of the next French Government and of M. Letourneau become clearer over the next few days.
In conclusion, as a general comment, it would seem that United States negotiators would, just at present, be hampered because they are not in a position to indicate what our policy towards aid, especially military, towards Indochina may be. Therefore, it is wondered whether these points should be raised at all at present. Furthermore if we take the initiative in such talks we run once again the risk of having the French place the question of their withdrawal from Indochina squarely on our doorstep. Lastly the concept of talking about complete independence for the Associated States at this time simply does not jibe with the idea of asking simultaneously for greater French effort in Indochina.