751G.00/11–2952: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1107. Dept pass Paris. Rptd info Paris 177, Hanoi unnumbered. As interim reply to Deptel 1074, Nov 25,1 wld state we have the opinions of Gen Alessandri (see mytel 1087, Nov 27)2 in whom we have confidence, of Gen Allard and others that it is possible to increase considerably and promptly the size of the Vietnamese Natl Army, provided France can and will supply an increased number of officers (of company and field grade) and non-coms. The question of equipment is not difficult and, while we do not have as yet Alessandri’s estimate of pay and maintenance of forty additional battalions, the sum shld not represent any considerable increase over the large amounts being spent by France, US and Vietnam for this war. Gen Trapnell is presently in Tonkin where he will discuss this problem with Salan. On his return we will get off a joint tel. It seems only too clear now after loss of Nghialo and the present disquieting operation at Na San where a large portion of the Franco-Vietnamese mobile striking forces is tied down in a possibly strong but dangerously isolated defensive position, that the number of troops in the field against the VM must be increased [Page 305] promptly and substantially. It is only too obvious that the opposing forces are too nearly in balance.
There appears to be little difficulty in rapidly recruiting privates nor is there any great difficulty found in training cadres of company grade although careful screening is required.
The present difficulty, as Col de Brebission points out in Paris tel 136 [3136] of Nov 26 to Dept3 lies in lack of cadres which only France can now supply. France cld, we believe, send the 200, or 300 additional officers and the 1,000 or 1,200 non-coms but, presumably, only at the cost of falling behind on her commitments to NATO and her ambition to set up the strongest force in Europe before a German army gets well started. There is an unresolved conflict between Fr requirements under NATO and her prosecution of a shooting war against communism in IC which must be resolved in the interest of a global defense and strategy against the Communist Central Command. The extra cadres which France shld send to break this near stalemate shld only be on temporary loan. The majority of them shld return after a year or two (during which it shld be possible to train Viet officers of field grade) all the better, militarily speaking, for having taken part in actual war. It is neither possible nor policy for us to send Amer troops or cadres to strengthen the situation in IC. We do not know whether it wld be possible for us to send temporarily additional Amer troops to Europe (train Amer recruits abroad instead of at home?) in an effort to restore European balance and confidence pending the return of some Fr officers and troops after victory in IC.
As regards the request in Deptel 1074 for our assessment of morale and effectiveness of new units, recent experience has shown that where Viet troops are commanded by good armed Fr-Viet cadres, they give a very good account of themselves.