Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/2–1152

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs ( Allison ) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[ Washington ,] February 11, 1952.

Problem

To determine what courses of action, political, military and economic, the U.S. may take to accomplish its objectives in Indochina in the event that no distinguishable Chinese aggression eventuates and, correlatively, Chinese technical and matériel assistance to the Viet Minh increases.

Discussion

U.S. Objectives:

To prevent Indochina (as well as Southeast Asia as a whole) from passing into the Communist orbit, to assist the Indochinese people to develop the will and ability to resist communism from within and without and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world. [This objective is embodied in the present NSC study on Southeast Asia; that study also includes the expression “to prevent Chinese Communist aggression, and to meet such aggression should it occur”.]² The Senior Staff Study, about to be presented to the NSC,³ is primarily designed to determine the courses of action which the U.S. may take to prevent Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and to meet such aggression, should it occur. This memorandum is prepared on the assumption that a distinguishable Chinese Communist aggression on Southeast Asia does not occur and that the Kremlin–Peiping strategists have concluded that their best interests are served by a continuance of their present tactics, i.e., increasing technical and matériel assistance to the Viet Minh until the forces of the French Union and the allies believe a continuance of the struggle unprofitable, or hopeless. This memorandum sets forth:

(a) certain general considerations which have been embodied in the Senior Staff Study for the NSC which, nonetheless, bear equally upon the problem with which this memorandum is concerned; and

(b) courses of action which the U.S. may take in the event the above assumption proves valid.

General Considerations:

1. Communist domination of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.

a. Any successful identifiable Chinese Communist aggression in this area, especially if achieved without encountering more than token resistance on the part of the United States or the UN, would have psychological and political consequences which might result in the relatively swift accommodation of the rest of Asia and thereafter of the Middle East to communism. Such a Communist success would tend to nullify the psychological advantages accruing to the free world by reason of its response to the aggression in Korea.

b. Serious consequences would also flow from successful communist subversion of these countries without identifiable aggression.

c. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.

d. The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual accommodation to communism.

e. Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities. Southeast Asia is a major exporter of rice upon which important areas of free Asia are dependent. Malaya is the principal source of dollar earnings for the United Kingdom.

2. Policies designed to strengthen the political and territorial integrity of the countries of Southeast Asia require sensitive selection and application, on the one hand to assure the optimum of military efficiency through coordination of measures for the general area, and on the other, to accommodate or to do minimum violence to the individual sensibilities of the several governments, social classes and minorities of the area.

3. The successful defense of Tonkin is one of the keys to the retention in non-communist hands of mainland Southeast Asia, with the possible exception of the Malay Peninsula. However, should Burma come under Communist domination, a communist military advance through Thailand would make Indo-China, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible. Thus, the route of communist advance into Southeast Asia will influence the execution of the following U.S. courses of action with respect to individual countries of the area.

4. France, following the Pau Conference (1950),⁴ made every political concession to the Associated States which the United States has deemed necessary and desirable, to give effect to the March 8, 1949 Accords⁵ and to enable them to develop their own national life. The effectiveness of these concessions has to a certain extent been limited, due to the tardiness with which they were made, the inability of the Associated States to take over, the lack of effective publicity about what had happened, and a lingering suspicion of French integrity.

5. In the long run, the security of Indochina against communism will depend upon the development of native governments able to command the support of the masses of the people and national armed forces capable of relieving the French of the major burden of maintaining internal security. Some progress is being made in the formation and development of national armies. However, the Vietnamese Government has been slow to assume its responsibilities and has continued to suffer from a lack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a) lingering Vietnamese suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with the apathetic and “fence-sitting” attitude of the bulk of the people; (b) the difficulty, common to all new and inexperienced governments, of training the necessary personnel and building an efficient administration; and (c) the failure of factional and sectional groups to unite in a concerted national effort.

6. The military situation in Indochina continues to be one of stalemate. Increased U.S. aid to the Franco-Vietnamese forces has been one important factor in enabling them to withstand recent communist attacks. However, Chinese aid to the Viet Minh in the form of logistic support, training, and technical advisors is increasing at a comparable rate. The prospect is for a continuation of the present stalemate in the absence of intervention by important forces other than those presently engaged.

7. While it is unlikely under the present circumstances that the French will suffer a military defeat in Indochina, there is a distinct possibility that the French Government will soon conclude that France cannot continue indefinitely to carry the burden of her total military commitments. From the French point of view, the possible means of lessening the present burden include: (1) a settlement with the communists in Indochina; (2) an agreement to internationalize the action in Indochina; (3) reduction of the NATO obligations of France.

8. A settlement based on a military armistice would be more complicated in Indochina than in the case of Korea. Much of Indochina is not firmly under the control of either side, but subject to occasional forays from both. Areas controlled by the opposing sides are interspersed, and lines of contact are fluid. Because of the weakness of the native governments, the dubious attitudes of the population even in areas under French control, and the certainty of continued communist pressure, it is highly probable that any settlement based on a withdrawal of French forces would be tantamount to handing over Indochina to communism. The United States should therefore continue to oppose any negotiated settlement with the Viet Minh.

9. In the event that information and circumstances point to the conclusion that France is no longer prepared to carry the burden in Indochina, or if France presses for a sharing of the responsibility for Indochina, whether in the UN or directly with the U.S. Government, the United States should oppose a French withdrawal and consult with the French and British concerning further measures to be taken to safeguard the area from communist domination. In anticipation of these possibilities, the United States should urgently re-examine the situation with a view to determining:

a. Whether U.S. participation in an international undertaking would be warranted.

b. The general nature of the contributions which the United States, with other friendly governments, might be prepared to make.

10. General Juin informed General Bradley and Field Marshal Slim on January 11, 1952 that the forces of the French Union and the Associated States could liquidate the Viet Minh in about eighteen months provided that:

a. Chinese assistance to the Viet Minh was not increased significantly beyond its present level;

b. U.S. assistance to French Union forces arrived on schedule; and

c. no massive Chinese intervention materializes.

11. It must be assumed that the Kremlin and Peiping are determined upon the domination of Southeast Asia, sooner or later. Therefore, we must assume that if the enemy fails to dominate Indochina (and/or Burma) through the successful execution of his present tactics, i.e., limited assistance to the Viet Minh, he must ultimately resort to stronger measures, including “distinguishable intervention”. The conclusion is inescapable: other things remaining the same, the security of Southeast Asia from Communist encroachment depends, in the final analysis, on the military neutralization of China.

Courses of Action

General:

Since present U.S. policy was in fact designed to enable the forces of the French Union and the Associated States to liquidate the Viet Minh on the assumption that “distinguishable Chinese aggression” would not occur, it follows that as long as that assumption is maintained, proper courses of action to be suggested at the present time can differ in no remarkable particular from those courses of action upon which we are already embarked. In short, since the national interest requires it, we must keep on keeping on in Indochina, until the Viet Minh is liquidated and therefore, no longer an effective instrument of the Kremlin and Peiping, or until events elsewhere in the world relieve, in whole or in part, the burden now borne by anti-communist forces in this theater of action.

Particular:

1. The U.S. must continue its present military assistance program to Indochina and must be prepared to increase it in accordance with the request of the Commanding General in the Theater, as approved by MAAG.

2. The U.S. must be prepared to assume an increasing share of the financial burden of the war in Indochina now borne by France. This may be done through:

a. an increase in our military and financial assistance program;

b. the provision of end items now paid for by the French in dollars;

c. an increase in budgetary assistance to Metropolitan France. As the struggle in Indochina continues the French will find increasingly compelling the choice between the support of the Indochinese operation and the support of French commitments to NATO. Because of the enormous physical difficulties attached to an evacuation of Indochina; because of the parlous effect of such a withdrawal on North Africa;⁶ and because of grave consequences on the French political scene of these two considerations, it seems to us likely that the French will choose to continue their Indochina operation at the expense of their NATO commitments. We should bear in mind that a reduction in the Indochina operation is a reduction in the realities of men and matériel in an active theater of war; reduction in NATO commitments are, in fact, paper reductions. This problem is so important and so complex as to require, it seems to us, consideration at the highest possible level.

3. The formation and commitment to battle of the Indochinese National armies should be accelerated in every possible way. In our opinion, this offers the most promising prospect of influencing the political complex in a positive way, and of providing additional assistance in an effective manner. In Indochina, as in other oriental countries, political stability as a practical matter, often results from the maintenance of a strong national army. In Indochina the national armies will represent the only attribute of sovereignty and independence which captures the imagination of the indigenous population. Finally, only through the commitment to battle of Indochinese troops can the problem of the shortage of French manpower in Indochina be solved. The formation of the national armies in Indochina has proceeded with reasonable speed, the limiting factors are shortage of cadres to train Indochinese officers and NCO’s, and shortage of equipment Therefore, the U.S. should be prepared:

a. to increase its supply of matériel to the national armies; and

b. enable the French to release training cadres now on duty in Europe for duty in Indochina;

c. to continue to press both French and Indochinese to appoint Indochinese commanders-in-chief of the national armies.

d. to consider assuming all or part of the financial burden now borne by the French necessary to the maintenance and increase of the Indochinese national armies. If an appreciable increase in American involvement in the Indochinese operation is justified, as we believe it to be, it seems clear that, for both political and military reasons, the U.S. should choose the national armies’ project as the first area in which it is prepared to accept increased direct responsibility. The following estimates of the cost of the national armies’ project are supplied to provide you with an idea of the burden it represents to France and, therefore, the magnitude of the responsibility which we might assume:

Current cost to France of the total military operation in Indochina is roughly U.S.$1,000,000,000 per year. The present national armies portion of that total is approximately U.S.$400 million. Both figures are exclusive of present U.S. matériel assistance at the rate of U.S.$200 million per year.

4. The extent and character of concessions made to Indochinese nationalism must be publicized in Indochina and the rest of Asia to the end that the three Associated States receive support, now lacking, from the indigenous populations of Indochina as well as from the other Asian powers. We are already discussing this project with the Psychological Warfare [Strategy] Board.

5. Press Bao Dai to take a more active and vigorous part in Vietnamese affairs. He should be pressed to:

a. Broaden the representations in his Government of Vietnamese political group such as the Cao Daists, Dai Viets, Catholics, etc.;

b. make public a national budget;

c. establish diplomatic missions abroad;

d. devote particular energy to the national armies’ project.

We should bear in mind that the measures we have taken in the past twenty-four months to assist the French and the Indochinese to liquidate the Viet Minh have been remarkably successful. Indochina is still in the control of anti-communist forces. This would have been impossible without U.S. assistance. The cost to the U.S. has been relatively small; the alternative to the courses of action we have taken was to admit the loss of Indochina and Southeast Asia to communist control. Since we predicated our course of action two years ago on the assumption of the same problem with which this memorandum is concerned it seems reasonable to assume that the continuation and augmentation of the same course of action as suggested in the foregoing will continue to be successful.

1. Drafted by William S. B. Lacy, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.
2. Brackets in the source text. The paper under reference, “NSC Staff Study on United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia”, Feb. 13, 1952, is printed in large part in U.S. Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967 (The Pentagon Papers), Book 8, pp. 468–476. This paper was circulated as an annex to NSC 124, Feb. 13, the NSC report on the same subject; NSC 124 is included in documentation on general policies of the United States with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area in volume xii .
3. Reference is to NSC 124.
4. At the Pau Conference, which concluded on Nov. 27, 1950, representatives of France and the Associated States sought to achieve the transfer of substantial economic sovereignty to the latter. For texts of 10 quadripartite agreements reached at the conference and signed on Dec. 16, 1950, see France, Direction de la Documentation, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, No. 1425 (January 24, 1951), pp. 1–38.
5. For information on the Accords, see footnote 5, p. 19.
6. For documentation on French North Africa, see volume xi .