751G.00/11–652: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State1
941. Rptd info Paris 164, Hanoi unnumbered. Had long talk with Letourneau yesterday evening and found him unusually preoccupied, almost to the point of discouragement, with the difficulties of (a) getting Bao Dai to display the activity and set the example which the internal political situation demands, of (b) getting the Indochinese budget through the Fr Assembly and of (c) overcoming increasing [Page 273] Fr opposition and defeatism with respect to the Fr effort in IC. With respect to (a), he said that his day had started with a surprise visit from Gaio and Gov Binh of North Vietnam who had asked him pointblank if he favored them and wld request Bao Dai to retain them in the govt. Letourneau had answered he liked them personally but that he cld not intervene in internal politics and polit appointments. Letourneau said that Binh had not been too bad a Governor of Tonkin but that there was now positive proof and wide knowledge of graft in his administration. When he, Letourneau, had visited Hanoi he had talked with (unnamed) leading “fence sitters”. Previously these men had told him they wld refuse to enter any govt until the Fr released their control of IC. Now the same men said that was no longer the obstacle; they realized the necessity of Fr “presence” at this time. They wld not, however, enter the govt or line up with Bao Dai until the regime was purged of its graft and corruption. Letourneau said that it was notorious that in the north appointments to such positions as Chief of Province were now being sold. Whether the money went into Gov Binh’s pocket or the pockets of his immediate entourage was immaterial. Letourneau felt that the replacement of Binh by Tri wld be a great step forward since Tri was essentialy honest man although not, Letourneau said, “as honest as you are and I try to be”. Tri had been out of office for a year and a quarter but nevertheless had been able to make two trips to France and purchase a new house. I cld not have done that, Letourneau said, out of the savings from official salary. He was afraid, however, that Bao Dai wld not accept Tri. He was not sure of Bao Dai‘s present attitude toward Tri and there was also the circumstance that Binh was one of Bao Dai‘s favorites.
Letourneau cld not go to Bao Dai and accuse Binh of grafting. Bao Dai might as a result of such complaint remove Binh from office but he wld tell Binh his dismissal was the result of Fr request and France wld have another enemy. In spite of his grafting, Binh was not a bad element. What was needed was not to drive Binh or others out of polit life but for Bao Dai to exert his authority to compel Binh and other office-holders to be honest. It wld be tremendously difficult to instill habits of official honesty in Vietnam. Letourneau had recently complained to Tam for having appointed a man of known dishonesty and Tam had replied sadly that it was impossible to appoint a completely honest Governor in Vietnam. Most Vietnamese looked to public office as a legitimate opportunity for private enrichment. Nevertheless, Letourneau said, in spite of tradition, honest administration must be enforced in Vietnam. In his first talk with Bao Dai, he wld insist most strongly on this point. Whatever crimes and defects the VM might have, VM admin was honest and only an honest govt cld prevail against the VM. One thing that Bao Dai shld do is to abolish legalized [Page 274] gambling in Saigon. While in France Letourneau had urged Bao Dai to take this step but the latter had refused to discuss the matter.
Letourneau said that my estimate of Bao Dai‘s “cost” of the gambling concession of two to two and a half million piastres per month was too low. His Majesty was getting a good four million piastres ($800,000 a par of exchange) a month as his rake-off from Cholon gambling. To my inquiry whether Tam had succeeded to ex-Premier Huu‘s rake-off from the gambling concession Letourneau said he supposed so but that he hoped and believed that Tam was not putting it into his pocket but was adding it to the Govt’s political fund. Letourneau said that he was persuaded of Tam‘s general honesty and good intentions although fact that Tam still kept as his mistress Le Thi Gioi, locally reputed to be the queen of the black market, was a disturbing circumstance. I remarked that this week’s “fireside radio chat” of Tam had stressed the necessity of official honesty.
Letourneau said that, income-wise, Bao Dai must be “about the wealthiest man in the world” since he received 90,000,000 piastres or roughly $4.5 million a year from the Govt, (Note: this payment is not shown in recently published Vietnamese budget) to which must be added his rake-off from gambling.
Letourneau remarked he felt very badly about both the action and inaction of Bao Dai. He liked Bao Dai who had many amiable qualities and undoubted intelligence. In the beginning “the only solution was the Bao Dai solution” and that was still true. The north and center still remained fundamentally monarchist. The monarchy was the only institution which cld hold this deeply divided country together but monarchical sentiment was diminishing rapidly because of Bao Dai‘s poor performance and example. Cochin China was of course Republican in sentiment and wld welcome the abolition of the monarchy but the north wld never stand for a Republic headed by a southerner anymore than Cochin China wld stand for a Republic headed by a northerner. If Bao Dai wld bring back the Empress, who was a Cochin Chinese, he wld also have influence and support in the south. Letourneau intended to express to Bao Dai his deep disappointment that the Empress had not returned. The Empress had promised the Crown Prince if he passed his baccalaureate examinations he cld spend his autumn school vacation in Vietnam which the boy was eager to do. The young Prince was intelligent—he had only failed by two points to obtain honorable mention in the baccalaureate examination—and was patriotic. He shld eventually make a good ruler. Letourneau said he wld also tell Bao Dai that he must immediately make a trip to the north to visit the sector now controlled by the Vietnamese [Page 275] national forces and commanded entirely by Vietnamese officers. Bao Dai shld also visit Phan-Thietcoo destroyed by the typhoon. If Bao Dai wld spend one week a month in official visits, public appearances and presiding occasional Cabinet meetings, the polit situation wld improve immediately. Letourneau was, however, dubious he wld be able to persuade him to even that much public activity. It was unfortunate that Bao Dai‘s chief of Cabinet, Nguyen De, was such a weak character. He was completely dominated by Bao Dai. What was needed was a man who wld stand up to Bao Dai and Letourneau was now persuaded that Bao Dai respected and wld heed strong opposition.
Letourneau said he was seriously preoccupied with the increased opposition in the Fr Assembly to the continuance of the Fr effort in IC and he was not certain that he wld be able to obtain necessary budget. Daladier’s2 consistent opposition to the Fr milit effort in Southeast Asia was not important, but Faure‘s joining the opposition was important since he enjoyed great influence among the younger members of the radical party. He hoped that his own party, and Pleven, wld hold firm but there was no denying the fact that the thesis that Fr shld forget Asia and concentrate wholly on its position in Africa was gaining ground. I interrupted to assert that if France lost out here, she might be unable to maintain her position in Morocco or Tunisia. Letourneau said emphatically that was of course absolutely true. The solution of the Tunisian and Moroccan problems cld only be achieved after Fr success in IC. He was confident of eventual Fr milit and polit victory in IC. He only wished that Salan cld produce a victory in time for the budgetary discussions.
He had told Salan that he wld never ask him to undertake any mil operation timed and designed purely to affect sentiment in metropolitan France. He had said to Salan, however, that it wld be most fortunate if some victory cld be achieved at this time. Letourneau agreed with me that it was unlikely that this wld happen. The Fr had pushed on to Phu Tho and had encountered no Vietminh troops. Obviously the VM were avoiding and wld probably be able to avoid battle at this precise time.
He feared that within his own party he wld meet the suggestion that an effort be made to effect some armistice arrangement with the VM. That any effort to reach a peaceable compromise with the VM wld be successful was inconceivable. If he were instructed to attempt such an arrangement he wld resign.
[Page 276]I inquired whether if I made some press statement or speech here asserting my entire conviction of the ultimate mil success of the Franco-In forces that wld help him in his efforts to maintain present Fr policy in IC. He said that it wld be decidedly helpful. I told him I wld think over the matter and let him know in a few days. Will the Dept please instruct. One difficulty wld be to find a suitable date and forum. There are no holidays between Armistice Day which wld be too soon and Thanksgiving Day which wld be too late.3
- This telegram was transmitted in three parts.↩
- Edouard Daladier, member of the National Assembly; Premier of France in 1933, 1934, and 1938–1940.↩
- In telegram 1059 from Saigon, Nov. 22, Ambassador Heath reported that Letourneau had not raised again the question of the proposed statement. Heath no longer planned to make the statement unless the Minister experienced unexpected difficulties. (751G.00/11–2252)↩