751G.5/8–1552: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
382. Dept pass Paris, London; rptd info Paris 95 for MacArthur,1 London 8; Hanoi, Singapore unnumbered. It is of utmost importance that Fr-Viet mil effort in Tonkin shld not deteriorate into mere holding and cleanup operation leaving initiative to Commie VM. A mil near stalemate wld tend to perpetuate polit near stalemate.
Actually, however, even if the offensive spirit of command and troops were at highest pitch no effective offensive cld be undertaken against VM because Fr-Viet forces lack indispensable element to force the elusive enemy to battle—namely sufficient planes for more massive air drops of parachute battalions. Lack of transport for air drops has long been realized by MAAG and Def and Delattre and more recently Letourneau have pleaded for sufficient air transport, but their requests have largely failed because of our lack of planes; specifically of C-47’s which have not been produced for some years. It is to be regretted that when Letourneau presented his requests in Wash in June last Gen Salan‘s survey of sitn had not developed into definite plan of bringing one or more of VM divs, now resting and [Page 241] recruiting, to bay in early autumn through a three battalion parachute drop on enemy’s rear. This operation requires loan of about 45 C-47’s or their equivalent. This is clearly set forth in tel 54953 of Gen Trapnell, Chief of MAAG, from AFOMS.2
According to Air Force Commander Chassin only about 30 additional Fr transport pilots wld be required. They cld be loaned from Fr Metropolitan forces without difficulty. Chassin states there are only about 20 Fr Metropolitan C-47’s available; one incomplete squadron and six training planes at Toulouse.
If USAF pays heed to Gen Trapnell‘s tel we certainly shld be able to round up 25 planes around the Pac or even in the states on a temporary loan basis. Against this being done is the natural conservatism of Fr Def Ministry, probable opposition of NATO (Paris 26, Aug 1)3 which has no responsibility for this actual war in progress here, and natural reluctance of our own Air Force to lend even for a short period any of its transport planes.
Yet the urgent need here is for victories which are possible if Salan gets loan of crews and planes without delay.
If Depts of State and Def will insist both vis-à-vis Fr and our own aviation, those planes can probably be found and loaned.
I believe we must bring to this prob same sense of urgency which animated Berlin and Korean airlifts.
If we fail to act with speed and decision then Franco-Viet forces are probably condemned to costly and dangerous near stalement in IC for months to come—if not longer.4
- Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of Embassy at Paris.↩
- Not printed.↩
- In telegram 731 from Paris (repeated to Saigon as telegram 26), Aug. 1, not printed, the Embassy in France reported that General Salan had raised the issue of transport planes with Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, on July 31. General Gruenther had suggested that General Salan discuss the matter with General Ridgway, the Supreme Allied Commander. (751G.5/8–152)↩
- In telegram 362 to Saigon (repeated to Paris as telegram 951), Aug. 19, the Department of State stated that the issue of additional transport planes was receiving active attention. It had been discussed with the Department of Defense that day. Defense was asking the Military Assistance Advisory Group at Saigon for additional information. Heath was informed that the Department of State endorsed his recommendations and recognized the need for prompt action, and was assured that Defense held similar views. (751G.5/8–1552)↩