Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/5–2653: Telegram

No. 76
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

secret
priority

Washington, May 28, 1953—11:47 a.m.

985. Your 1224.² Chinese position on general cease fire appears amply met by draft agreement Bangkok’s 2365³ (Taipei 50 Rangoon 105) which accepted by Burmese without modification. Guiding principle is any troops disposed leave may leave in peace anywhere in Burma. Request you see Foreign Minister soonest impressing this on him and urging importance Chinese Government give its representative definite instructions accept draft agreement and expedite Committee contact with Chinese commanders of troops in Burma.

General cease fire before basic arrangements for evacuation agreed on manifestly not feasible: in areas outside Monghsat region not only scattered KMT groups subject minimum control but also insurgents with whom KMT in some cases collaborate. GOB cannot leave villages these areas defenseless and certainly cannot relax precautions until known which troops will obey evacuation orders. Number and location such troops can only be determined through consultation with their commanders.

Commanders in turn must presumably be ordered by Chinese Government through Li Mi cooperate with Committee. While recognizing Chinese Government does not exercise complete authority and orders may in some cases be ignored Department considers it essential such orders be issued as demonstration Chinese good faith and intention exert maximum influence over commanders. Direct contact between Committee and commanders imperative first step. If Chinese Government deems preliminary contact inadvisable Monghsat area Committee might agree first meet representatives Bangkok or Chiengmai.

Department concerned at apparent tendency Chinese Government dissociate itself from responsibility for decisions by Li Mi and believes you should strongly emphasize danger to Chinese position in UN if demonstrable results not achieved by September UNGA. It is Chinese Government not Li Mi who will be under fire in UN. Not only should Li Mi be ordered instruct commanders cooperate with Committee immediately but he should issue written instructions his forces to return Formosa as suggested Bangkok’s 2352.⁴ This appears most feasible means exerting Li’s influence at present. If it should prove later date his presence essential achieve satisfactory evacuation Burmese objections may be overcome.

Urge Foreign Minister take action soonest along above lines.

Smith

1. Repeated to Rangoon and Bangkok.
2. Dated May 26; it reported that the Chinese Government rejected Burma’s proposal of a temporary safety zone in the Mong Hsat area. Until a general ceasefire was put into effect, the Chinese Government considered it impossible for the Joint Committee to visit Mong Hsat, and Li Mi would not order his troops to cooperate with the Committee. (690B.9321/5–2653)
3. See footnote 2, supra.
4. Not printed.