Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/5–2953: Telegram

No. 77
The Chargé in the Republic of China (Jones) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Taipei, May 29, 1953—5 p.m.

1232. Reference Bangkok’s telegram to Department 2365² repeated Rangoon 105, Taipei 50 and Embtel to Department 1229³ rptd info Rangoon 28, Bangkok 30. Accompanied by Army Attaché, I had conference with Li Mi and Foreign Minister this morning as result of which Chinese Government will probably make counterproposal to establish cease-fire in territory east of Salween River, prior to visit of Communists to Monghsat. Foreign Minister was also accompanied by General Pau-Lin of MND.

Li Mi brought out his order of battle to demonstrate position of his forces. He said it was impracticable for him to accept cease-fire and safety zone in Monghsat area alone because of exposed position of his troops in north wedged between Burmese white flag Communist troops and Chinese Communist troops. The moment the news is broadcast of safety zone encompassing his headquarters, he anticipates simultaneous attack by Communist troops from both sides. Since his units are entirely supplied from Monghsat, he regards it as impracticable to cut them off from their headquarters.

If Burmese deem it unfeasible to effect cease-fire throughout this territory because they cannot control dissident groups, then Li Mi suggested cease-fire east of Salween be subject to two conditions:

(1) If his troops were attacked during cease-fire, they would defend themselves;

(2) His headquarters must have right to maintain logistical support of these units. However, he does not believe attack will come if cease-fire is general throughout area east of Salween, especially if conditions are made known since Communists will assume this northern area will fall into their hands like ripe plum as soon as his troops are evacuated recognizing validity of Burmese argument that general cease-fire was not feasible because of dissident groups, Li Mi said if his proposal of cease-fire east of Salween were adopted, only one additional safety zone would have to be established at later stage west of Salween to enable his troops at Tangyang to withdraw.

It was apparent during conference that in matters of implementation position of Chinese Government [will?] be largely determined by Li Mi. It also seemed evident that he had reluctantly been convinced that genuine effort must be made to evacuate his troops. He spoke of UN decision and said he realized international prestige of his government was at stake and would do his utmost to cooperate, although he himself felt that the best solution was to equip his troops and send them back to Yunnan.

Li Mi also urged that as soon as possible his own representative should work directly with committee. He would like very much to be there himself, he said, but his health still prevented. Although he looked in pink of condition, keen, alert, bright-eyed, ready smile, he said his doctors advised him it was still impossible for him to travel by plane. His blood pressure frequently soared as much as thirty degrees in one day, he said.

Foreign Minister reported he had only just received a translation of American plan outlined in Bangkok’s 2365 to Department and had no opportunity as yet to discuss it with other officials of his government. I again urged that it was to the interest of his government to approve the plan and obtained the impression that he himself saw no objections—that the major hurdle was question of area involved in initial cease-fire.

Detailed report of conversation follows by pouch.⁴

Jones

1. Repeated to Rangoon and Bangkok.
2. See footnote 2, Document 75.
3. Telegram 1229 from Taipei, May 28, reported that Jones gave the U.S. “draft tentative agreement” to Yeh, who elaborated on the Chinese position of insistence on a general ceasefire. (690B.9321/5–2853)
4. Not printed.