690B.9321/5–2553: Airgram
No. 74
The Acting Secretary
of State to the Embassy in the Republic
of China
A–222.… reports recently received by the Department indicate that there is strong pressure by some groups within the Chinese Government not only to prevent withdrawal of any part of Li Mi’s forces from Burma but to maintain the flow of supplies to them. One report indicated that the Chinese hoped to instigate a revolt among Shan leaders against Burmese authority in order to set up an independent Shan state which the Chinese could control. Another report alleges that efforts are being made by Fu Shing Air Lines to purchase four-motored aircraft in the United States presumably for the purpose of supplying Li Mi’s troops, and one report even claims that a Chinese Air Force 4-motored bomber is currently engaged in supply drops.
Although individually these reports are of questionable reliability, there seems to be enough evidence of strong opposition to withdrawal of Li Mi’s forces and of intention to continue their support from Formosa on the part of some groups within the Chinese Government which have a considerable degree of independence of action, such as the Continental Operations Department, as to cast some doubt upon the ability of the Chinese Government to follow through on its commitments to cooperate actively with other interested parties to give effect to the UN resolution on the Li Mi forces.… Embassy reports that it is the strongly-held view of the Chinese Foreign Office that Li Mi’s forces should be withdrawn from Burma and that whole-hearted cooperation should be given by the Chinese Government to UN-sponsored efforts to this end.
While it is realized that the Embassy can not play any direct part in what appears to be a serious conflict of views within the Chinese Government on this issue, the Embassy may be able to strengthen the hand of the Foreign Office by intimating during [Page 106] conversations with the Foreign Minister on the subject of the Li Mi troops, its awareness of pressures within the Government against the official position of the Chinese Government and the concern of the U.S. Government that the Chinese Government adhere firmly to it. In this connection, the Embassy may wish to point out to the Foreign Minister that were air drops to the Li Mi troops in Burma to be re-initiated, or any other attempt to resupply the Li Mi forces, this activity would soon be discovered by the Burmese and make further negotiations for the evacuation of these troops impossible. Such action would not only be in direct contravention of Chinese Government commitments to Burma and the UN, but would also constitute deliberate defiance of the UN resolution.
Under these circumstances the Burmese Government could be expected to press its complaint against the Chinese Government in the next GA with increased vigor and bitterness. Judging by the considerable support and sympathy for the Burmese position expressed in the last GA, a renewed Burmese attack under circumstances such as this might well result in seriously undermining the Chinese Government’s position in the UN, a process which may well have already started as a result of the recent GA airing of the Burmese complaint. This would be especially true if an armistice in Korea had been achieved, as in such an event it is feared that some Governments, not only in the Communist bloc but also in the free world, would be anxious to find a pretext for discrediting the Chinese Government in order to pave the way for its replacement in the UN by the Peiping regime. Since the U.S. Government will remain strongly opposed to the seating of the Chinese Communists in the UN and in favor of the retention of China’s seat by the Chinese Government whether or not an armistice is achieved in Korea, it would regard with deep concern any developments which might lead to a serious weakening of the Chinese Government’s position in the UN. Were the Chinese Communists to succeed in establishing themselves in the United Nations at the expense of the Chinese Government, it would seem indisputable that the Chinese Communists’ gain in terms of political prestige and power in Southeast Asia would far more than offset the advantages to the Chinese Government, whatever they might be, of maintaining three or four thousand troops in Burmese territory.
While it seems apparent from Embassy reports that the foregoing line of reasoning is fully understood and accepted by the Foreign Minister and his colleagues, their hands in the apparent struggle over this issue within the Chinese Government might be strengthened if they were in a position to make it clear that the U.S. Government is also deeply concerned as to the possible consequences of deliberate defiance of the UN mandate with respect to [Page 107] the Chinese troops in Burma. Unless the Embassy perceives objections, therefore, an appropriate occasion should be taken to discuss this matter with the Foreign Minister along the foregoing lines.1
- On June 10, the Embassy reported that the pertinent paragraphs of the airgram were conveyed that morning to the Foreign Minister, who was to see President Chiang later that day. (Telegram 1276; 690B.9321/6–1053)↩