Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/4–953: Telegram

No. 66
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

top secret
priority

Washington, April 10, 1953—7:33 p.m.

1613. Your 1969² and 1978.³

1. It appears from recent communications that despite your efforts GOB does not understand that it has not given satisfactory response Chinese offer cooperate given two weeks ago (Deptel 1538).⁴ Developments since that time give impression that GOB, at same time it is presenting its case before UN, is attempting settle problem out of hand by armed force rather than peaceful methods. At our insistence Li Mi was enjoined against offensive action and supply flights and subsidies from Formosa, from whatever source, were banned (Deptel 1421).⁵ This was done to lay groundwork for peaceful settlement.… Department recognizes GOB within sovereign rights in attempting drive unwanted alien troops from territory, but it is nevertheless fact that continued military pressure at this time makes for impossible situation and may lead to disavowal of undertakings gained to date from Chinese Government and nullification our efforts toward peaceful solution. GOB should therefore agree suspend operations.

2. We recognize GOB must have tangible evidence Chinese Government’s cooperativeness to justify any order suspending operations. Such order could be made contingent upon Formosa’s public announcement “agreement in principle” to withdraw troops. Once GOB agreed to suspend operations, new request would be made of Chinese Government to make such public announcement on understanding both sides to cease hostilities. Department believes that only through virtual cease-fire can atmosphere be created in which means for working out any withdrawal may be effected.

3. To initiate above action you should call on Prime Minister soonest and, using in your discretion foregoing and other available arguments, point out that regardless of rights of matter facts must be faced if our efforts not to suffer total collapse; that proposals outlined paragraph two are only means we now see avoiding such collapse and US can go no further along present course unless GOB is willing to cooperate; that failure GOB comply with present request or offer feasible alternative can only be construed as desire block peaceful settlement. If Prime Minister reacts negatively you may your discretion inform him that while US will not cease to advocate withdrawal, Department does not see what further concrete action it can usefully take toward solution impasse.

4. If GOB does wish we pursue good offices and is willing abate hostilities and assuming GOB does wish troops leaving Burma via Thailand, GOB should also state (a) whether it desires US Govt assist in negotiating with Thailand for transit agreement or whether GOB desires do this itself; (b) whether it is willing designate military representative discuss evacuation questions with other powers unofficially and outside Burma if necessary (for example arrangement outlined Bangkok’s 1998 Rangoon 79 Taipei 30).⁶

5. Our interest helping Burma this matter will be neither stimulated nor abated by course of UN discussion.

6. Taipei has been asked forward true text any recent public statement by George Yeh on Burma (your 1969).

Smith

1. Also sent to Taipei, Bangkok, and USUN.
2. Dated Apr. 8; the Embassy reported a conversation with Kyaw Nyein, who told Sebald that the Burmese Government had decided to continue to press its case in the United Nations and to continue military operations. (690B.9321/4–853)
3. Dated Apr. 9; it responded to telegram 1592 (Document 64). Sebald thought the Department’s proposal would be unacceptable to the Burmese, who thought the basic problem was political and the only obstacle to a solution was the need for a Chinese decision to evacuate. (690B.9321/4–953)
4. Document 59.
5. Dated Mar. 10; it summarized Yeh’s oral statement of Mar. 7. See footnote 1, Document 44.
6. Dated Apr. 9; the Embassy suggested that the Burmese and Thai military attachés in Bangkok meet with an officer of the Thai police and a U.S. representative to work out evacuation plans. (690B.9321/4–953)