Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/4–1853: Telegram

No. 67
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Rangoon, April 18, 1953—6 p.m.

2014. In lengthy interview today with acting Foreign Minister replies were given by him to proposal made to Prime Minister (mytel 2000).² In essence, GUB response as follows: GUB agreeable suspend operations against KMTs on conditions that: (1) Formosa make public statement that it agrees in principle to withdraw KMT troops from Burma; (2) that it would take steps to implement withdrawal of these troops immediately after cessation of hostilities, and (3) for that purpose an area should be defined to which KMT forces should withdraw and gather preparatory to making withdrawal. Burmese forces would feel free engage other scattered forces in areas separate from that defined, but prepared instruct local commanders do everything possible encourage withdrawal such scattered forces to defined area.

GUB desires that negotiation for withdrawal KMT troops via Thailand be conducted by US.

Regarding designation of military representative to discuss evacuation with other powers unofficially and outside Burma, GUB while prepared to discuss with Thai and US authorities, are unable to do same with representatives of Formosa. Details of withdrawal, etc., that may come up for discussion between Burma and Formosa may be conducted through good offices of US representative.

Regarding condition (1) above, I asked meaning of words “agrees in Principle”, stating that in my previous conversations it had been made clear that “agreement in principle” referred to undertaking which I had handed Foreign Minister March 29 (mytel 1872).³ Kyaw Nyein replied that on other hand he had understood “agreement in principle” meant agreement to withdraw troops without further qualification. In view this misunderstanding Kyaw Nyein’s part, he will again raise matter with Cabinet (mytel 2010)⁴ for purpose ascertaining whether qualified “agreement in principle” acceptable.⁵

“Suspension operations” would be mutual on agreed date and on assumption KMTs would then immediately set evacuation plans into operation. On question of disarming troops, Kyaw Nyein said it imperative that steps be taken ensure arms will not fall into hands Burmese insurgents by sale or otherwise. He agreed Burmese Military Attaché Bangkok or additional military officer could be authorized assist in working out practical problems in conjunction with US and Thai officers.

Comment: GUB approaching acquiescence proposal Deptel 1613.⁶ It is possible misunderstanding mentioned above is deliberate. As previously reported, neither Prime Minister nor Kyaw Nyein are happy about qualifications in Taipei’s “agreement in principle”.

I believe it would be helpful create improved atmosphere if Taipei would now give some indication of concrete steps it proposes to take, if agreement cease-fire reached, to cooperate in effecting withdrawal. Some such indication would greatly assist me in convincing GUB probable effectiveness Taipei’s cooperation.

Sebald

1. Repeated to Taipei and Bangkok.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed. The undertaking was that reported in telegram 1013 from Taipei; see footnote 2, Document 59.
4. Not printed.
5. On Apr. 22, the Embassy in Rangoon reported that Kyaw Nyein showed Sebald an informal memorandum expressing the Burmese Government’s views: the government was prepared to suspend military operations, not because the Chinese Government had agreed to announce, with many qualifications, its agreement in principle, but because the government wished to enable the United States to exercise its good offices. (Telegram 2047; 690B.9321/4–2253)
6. Document 66.