Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–2753: Telegram

No. 59
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

top secret
priority

Washington, March 27, 1953—7:38 p.m.

1538. Taipei’s 1013² repeated separately contains Foreign Minister’s agreement to send formal communication along lines requested our 745.³ We consider this undertaking satisfactory for our purposes at this stage. You are authorized at your discretion communicate quoted text to Burmese Government in confidence. If you are opposed to giving it to GOB, telegraph your reasons priority.

Seek to induce GOB, on strength this concession by Chinese Government, to agree at once withdraw its complaint to UN. Point out that this conciliatory step by Taipei may well put GOB in indefensible position before UN if it should persist with its complaint refusing to exploit avenue toward settlement which has now been opened up, since UN traditionally does not act so long as possibility direct settlement remains open. If GOB spurns this gesture and presses complaint against Chinese Nationalists at this critical time, highly unlikely latter will maintain offer in which case further US efforts would be pointless.

Department recognizes GOB must make public statement to justify withdrawal and hopes obtain Chinese agreement to publicity if GOB acquiesces.

Also make preliminary soundings looking to immediate establishment four man committee to assist in bringing about settlement with one national from Burma, Thailand, China joined by one from U.S. Remind GOB that terms of reference of proposed committee will not include any fact finding responsibilities. They will be charged solely with determining degree of feasibility and best means of disarmament and withdrawal.

Ensure that GOB does not overlook steps already agreed to by Chinese Government reported paragraphs 2 and 3 Deptel 1421.⁴

Dulles

1. Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei.

2. Dated Mar. 27; the Embassy reported that Yeh was willing to send a formal communication agreeing that the U.S. Government could communicate in confidence to the Burmese and Thai Governments a statement that the Chinese Government agreed in principle to cooperate with the U.S. Government in effecting the removal of Li Mi’s troops from Burma, but that in view of the practical difficulties it envisaged, including the fact that it did not exercise full control over the troops, it could not be held responsible for not accomplishing more than was feasible or reasonable under the circumstances. (690B.9321/3–2753)

   Telegram 1032 from Taipei, Mar. 31, transmitted the text of Yeh’s letter, dated Mar. 31, which included the above statement and an additional paragraph stating that the Chinese Government could not be expected to exercise any influence on Li Mi’s troops unless and until the Burmese attacks on them were ended. Rankin commented that he did not interpret the last paragraph as a qualification of the agreement but merely as a statement specifying an essential step which should be taken as soon as possible. (690B.9321/3–3153)

3. Supra.
4. Dated Mar. 10; it summarized Yeh’s oral statement of Mar. 7. See footnote 1, Document 44.