Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/4–353: Telegram

No. 61
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Rangoon, April 3, 1953—10 a.m.

1924. My telegram 1922.² In lengthy interview with Kyaw Nyein,³ Acting Foreign Minister beginning 11 o’clock last night what appeared to be relatively simple recommendations set forth reference telegram have developed into somewhat different concept on part GUB for solution KMT problem (although points raised were put to me in form questions calling for “clarification” with view “creating favorable atmosphere in Burma because of desperate situation in which GUB finds itself they throw light on manner in which GUB would like to handle situation and problem (points are presented in order they were explained to me)):

1. In opinion of United States can effective withdrawal be completed within one month or so (meaning before the monsoon breaks say mid-May)? Comment: “Effective withdrawal” might be defined as withdrawal of “hard-core”.

2. Can withdrawal be through country other than Burma? Comment: Burmese are thinking in terms of Thailand.

3. Would United States continue to use good offices alone and attempt effect withdrawal itself and not through device of three or four power committee? Comment: United States as good offices power would work directly with governments concerned requesting such assistance as might be necessary.

4. On assumption disarmament and repatriation would take place outside Burma might Burma have an observer present at disarmament point?

5. In event attempted withdrawal should be unsatisfactory GUB should be compelled again raise matter in United Nations “Can GUB presume that United States Government would support Burma?” Comment: I asked for definition of word “support”. Kyaw Nyein said he was referring to direct appeal to Security Council where Burma would not wish sponsorship by Soviet Union. Some other country might sponsor but GUB desires United States support as otherwise might be forced rely on Soviets with whom GUB does not wish become associated.

6. Would United States be agreeable to Burma’s armed forces not slackening operations during course of negotiations and preparations for withdrawal. Comment: Kyaw Nyein said GUB would adopt reasonable attitude in practical application this point. Purpose this point is endeavor prevent building up KMT strength in Burma during negotiations as happened in North Korea.

7. Assuming “favorable atmosphere” created by clarification above points GUB would like to explore following basis for procedure in United Nations:

(a) Would United States be prepared take initiative in proposing resolution to postpone discussions?

(b) Would United States be prepared in proposing resolution make statement indicating or suggestion United States is opposed to presence these troops on Burmese soil and that they represent threat peace SEA (or some similar statement)?

(c) Would United States be willing give as reason for its motion fact that United States is exercising good offices to effect withdrawal within reasonable time?

Kyaw Nyein said satisfactory resolution of above questions would make it possible for GUB “bring about peaceful solution” by agreeing postpone discussion until next General Assembly (assuming that breakdown United States efforts do not compel GUB in interim raise matter directly with Security Council).

Above points were all given me orally but I have attempted as nearly as possible use Kyaw Nyein’s exact words (from notes taken during conversation). Language is not precise but I believe GUB feels itself hard-pressed internally and wishes demonstrate to Burmese people GUB and United States desire find solution. I pointed out difficulties which several above points raise and that failure United States efforts for reasons beyond our control might attach entire onus on United States. Kyaw Nyein felt this would not be case. In any event GUB feels only United States has influence and prestige necessary bring about withdrawal.

Ancillary to above I asked whether recent actions GUB are result of Chinese People’s Republic pressure. Kyaw Nyein assured me not the slightest pressure from CPR which circumstance worries GUB as present “political correctness” CPR may be in preparation for pressure to come later.

I am convinced GUB sincerely searching for way out and desires meet United States wishes that item not be publicly debated in United Nations but at same time seeks allay almost hysterical public opinion (and threatened party dissensions) by demonstrating that concrete steps are being taken with assistance of United States which give real prospect withdrawal KMT troops from Burma.

Request Department’s comment and instructions soonest.

By separate telegram I am sending substance personal letter from Prime Minister to me⁴ which Kyaw Nyein handed me before beginning conversation.

Sebald

1. Repeated to Taipei and Bangkok.
2. Dated Apr. 2; it reported that the Embassy had learned that several leading Burmese Cabinet members had recommended to Nu that Burma accept the U.S. assurance that it was attempting to find a solution to the KMT problem, agree to postpone U.N. discussion of the issue, and agree to the establishment of a Chinese-Thai U.S. commission with a Burmese “unofficial observer.” (690B.9321/4–253)
3. Kyaw Nyein was at this time Minister of Industries.
4. The substance of the letter was reported in telegram 1925 from Rangoon, Apr. 3. In it Nu stated that his government would be strengthened in dealing with opposition in the country if Sebald would advise the Department of State to give every possible consideration to the suggestions presented by Kyaw Nyein. (690B.9321/4–353)