890B.00 TA/3–3153: Telegram
No. 60
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State
priority
1903. Deptel 1536.1 Cancellation TCA aid gives us cause to examine our basic approach to Burma and reaction our policies have had on Burmese attitude toward United States in effort overcome ill effects recent actions and take constructive steps promote lasting improvement our relations.
One of our most serious handicaps has been that we have necessarily been too conspicuous in Burma with too many Americans in evidence and too much involvement in what Burmese consider their own internal affairs. Unfortunately the concept of Point 4 aid has made this inevitable. Our … operations have increased Burmese suspicion of our motives and have led large number believe we have sinister designs on their independence and integrity. At same time however, Burmese have become increasingly anti-Communist as result experience with their own Communist insurgents and observation Communist tactics in other countries. In absence external aggression possibility local Communists gaining control this country either through armed force or subversion appears remote. While termination TCA aid will handicap present rate economic development it will not materially increase likelihood Communist penetration.
Although Burmese appreciate benefits they have gained impression that in accepting aid they are limiting their own free democratic faction and doing us favor by accommodating United States foreign policy objectives. This impression is supported by apparent eagerness with which aid offered, serious concern with which we faced possible termination aid under Kem amendment,2 and failure or inability explain our motives convincingly to oriental mind in terms our own long range self-interest. Bulk of Burmese people simply unable understand aid in terms of altruism.
Frustration arising out of KMT problem has also been major factor in Burmese search for whipping boy and hope pressure along military and political fronts would force quick solution before [Page 88] public hysteria might cause governmental crisis especially in view widely held public belief GUB failed act this issue past two years because of American pressure.
In view these considerations believe we should seize present opportunity withdraw from local limelight for reasonable period. In making administrative arrangements terminate TCA program therefore recommend we seek clear-cut break and plan withdraw completely for time being. Realize some projects could not be stopped forthwith without serious waste and economic loss but believe even these should be terminated at earliest practicable date and with minimum personnel.
If as I believe will be the case after period reflection not confused by extraneous factors GUB should take initiative in seeking renewed aid request could be considered on its merits and in more favorable and realistic atmosphere.
- Dated Mar. 7; it requested the Embassy’s views on the possibility of suggesting to the Burmese the suspension rather than the termination of the TCA program. (890B.00 TA/3–2753)↩
- The Kem amendment, Section 1302 of Public Law 45 (approved June 2, 1951; 65 Stat. 63), prohibited U.S. economic aid to any country that exported arms, ammunition, or strategic materials to the Soviet Union or any of its satellite countries, specifically including Communist China.↩