Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/4–353: Telegram

No. 62
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

top secret
priority

Washington, April 4, 1953—2:28 p.m.

1578. Questions raised your 1924² indicate GOB misapprehension re our position on discussing question in UN. While you should reassure GOB our intention continue pushing “practical solution” regardless of UN developments, GOB should not be given idea we shrink from UN discussion; on contrary, now issue has been put on agenda³ we are willing it be aired. We cannot moreover take lead on question of postponement which is up to GOB. Answers your seven questions:

1. Probably not although we will continue press for rapid solution.

2. We are not averse to Thailand route which presumably only one in question. If Thai Government agrees as anticipated we will be as helpful as possible and US Embassy Bangkok is prepared make informal approach Thai Government if GOB and Formosa desire.

3. At this stage US Government is willing continue act as channel between non-recognizing governments Burma and China but decision as to committee will have to be taken in due course. US Government certainly not willing assume sole responsibility for solution.

4. We think it unrealistic assume any country would receive these troops if armed. Prime Minister Phibun told Thai press his Government would permit transit if disarmed (Bangkok’s 1939 pouched Rangoon).⁴

5. US must reserve position as such question could be answered only in context in which item raised in UN. For example we are unable support present Burmese resolution as now worded in terms of condemnation China. However, US position past, present and future is one of assisting GOB and supporting constructively any workable solution of problem.

6. US Government cannot respond for this and considers GOB must estimate effect of its operations on progress negotiations. Note however that Formosa has repeatedly demanded mutual cessation hostilities as prerequisite to any tangible accomplishment and specified this essential step must be taken soonest and before any committee starts to work (Taipei’s 1032 repeated Rangoon 14).⁵ Guarantees of safe passage must moreover be condition to any evacuation.

7. (a) While US Government will support postponement if agreed to by Burma and if such postponement appears to enjoy general support, US does not wish take initiative now that question is on agenda. GOB might wish suggest some other power for example India or Latin American propose postponement.

(b) Though unwilling propose postponement US would have no objection to making properly worded statement along general lines indicated, stating our opposition to presence these troops on Burmese soil in violation international law and Burmese sovereignty. Any statement would however avoid terminology implying possibility Chapter VII⁶ action against Chinese Government.

(c) Not pertinent, see (a). US would be willing however to state in any debate that we are using good offices and propose continue to do so.

For your guidance we are concerned that GOB appears assume US Government willing to go to almost any lengths and take public responsibility for solution solely to avoid UN debate. You should continue to assure GOB that US will continue use its influence and prestige toward practical solution, and expects its efforts will usefully supplement those of GOB. Re item 6 above Department recognizes difficulties of Burmese position but considers that notwithstanding UN aspect it is up to GOB to make some move toward truce in current confidential negotiations with Taipei, for example at least agree temporary suspension military action within specified areas along lines Bangkok’s 1965 (repeated Rangoon 75)⁷ to get situation off dead center.

Dulles

1. Repeated to Taipei, Bangkok, and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations (USUN) in New York.
2. Supra.
3. The General Assembly decided on Mar. 31 to include the item on its agenda under the title, “Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China.”
4. Not printed.
5. See footnote 2, Document 59.
6. Reference is to chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, signed June 26, 1945; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) 993, or 59 Stat. 1031.
7. Dated Apr. 4; the Embassy reported that the Burmese Chargé in Bangkok told Stanton he was urging Gen. Ne Win to temporarily suspend military action against the Chinese troops around Mong Hsat and between Mong Hsat and the Thai border, in the hope that plans could soon be worked out to evacuate them. (690B.9321/4–453)