690B.9321/3–2453: Telegram
No. 58
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in the Republic of
China1
priority
745. Embtel 996, March 24.2 Embassies Rangoon and Bangkok share view held here that second and third paragraphs Foreign Minister’s letter of March 21 renders so ineffective “agreement in principle” contained in first paragraph as to make letter virtually meaningless and unsatisfactory as basis for settlement.3 We are unable to accept as verified Taipei charge that Government of Burma is supplying arms to any Yunnan or other Communist leader. Li Mi’s forces admittedly will need assurance that they will not be massacred at such time as they lay down their arms, but this cannot be obtained until agreement in principle reached and withdrawal procedures arranged. No reason is seen why unqualified Chinese Government agreement in principle to withdrawal cannot be issued before withdrawal procedure arranged. We cannot carry through our effort to establish investigative committee until agreement in principle is reached with no conditions attached beyond those contained in first paragraph. It is hoped that such [Page 85] agreement would not cause loss of Li Mi’s control of troops. To extent such loss occasioned, it would be unavoidable.
As basis for next step you should endeavor to obtain formal communication from Foreign Minister containing substance of first paragraph only of his informal letter of March 24. We should be authorized to pass substance of such formal communication immediately to Burmese and Thai Governments.
Foreign Minister should realize present crisis is producing situation increasingly menacing to Chinese National troops in Burma.
Burmese UN Delegation has now received instructions to press for immediate inclusion KMT troops item on agenda GA4 and General Committee on which US is represented will have to meet probably not later than Monday to make recommendation to GA on inscription item. If General Committee recommends inscription GA will probably meet about Wednesday for consideration of inscription.
Chinese National Government will of course realize that unless it authorizes U.S. Government to make a communication to Burmese Government prior to that time which would give that Government public basis for withdrawing item there is every probability that GA will approve inscription.
- Repeated to Rangoon and Bangkok.↩
- Telegram 996 transmitted the text of an informal letter from Foreign Minister Yeh concerning Li Mi’s troops in Burma. The first paragraph stated that the Chinese Government agreed in principle to the withdrawal of the troops, but that in view of practical difficulties expected in the implementation of such an agreement, it could not be held responsible for not accomplishing more than was feasible or reasonable under the circumstances. Rankin noted that the phrasing of that paragraph had been modified slightly “as result my suggestion to Foreign Minister this morning in effort to meet Allison’s telephoned request of yesterday.” The second paragraph declared that since the Chinese Government did not exercise complete control over the troops, it would be futile to advise them to withdraw until the cessation of attacks on them by Burmese forces or by forces under the command of a Yunnan Communist leader, who, the letter alleged, the Burmese Government was supplying with arms. The third paragraph stated that the Chinese argument in principle should be kept secret until ways had been found to implement it, because premature disclosure might cause the dispersal of Li Mi’s troops before they could be evacuated. (690B.9321/3–2453)↩
- Sebald’s and Stanton’s comments were made in telegrams 1860 from Rangoon and 1883 from Bangkok, Mar. 26. (690B.9321/3–2653)↩
- A cable of Mar. 25 from Sao Hkun Hkio to the U.N. Secretary-General requested the inclusion of the item under the title “Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Kuomintang Government of Formosa”; for text, see U.N. document A/2375.↩