Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–2153: Telegram

No. 55
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State

top secret
niact

Rangoon, March 21, 1953—noon.

1813. Deptel 1477.¹ In strongest possible terms, but without giving offense or threat, I communicated Department’s views (Deptel 1470)² to Prime Minister last night. Upon completion substantive remarks, I pointed out advantages reconsidering action already taken which obviously would seriously undermine if not completely destroy friendly feelings in US for Burma.

Prime Minister appeared taken aback and partly repeated remarks made to me Thursday’s meeting (mytel 1792).³ He also said with some force he thought Department should appreciate that present difficulties have in part arisen in consequence GUB’s patient attitude adopted toward KMT problem largely in deference to what he understood Department’s desire that no definitive steps be taken raise matter in UN. He said this course was followed as result promptings my predecessor (Key) two years ago. Thus problem has dragged on for two years without any effective steps being taken remove KMT troops from Burma until GUB’s patience exhausted in consequence KMT depredations and attacks on Burmese troops.

I reiterated steps being taken on good offices basis, favorable results already obtained by Rankin, and hopes for early solution, which should be sufficient satisfy him and GUB that US Government making serious and urgent efforts solve problem.

After further discussion along these lines, I said crux of immediate problem is linking of KMT with TCA, and that surely some way can be found separate two problems, discuss each on its merits. Prime Minister said he thought this might be done, adding, however, “the decision about TCA is unalterable. We must take our chances that some provision can be made for Burma, if your government willing reinstate program, after KMT problem is solved”. Prime Minister agreed re-examine possibility disentangle KMT problem from notice termination TCA aid. Assured me would discuss matter at next Cabinet meeting March 23. He would not promise success, but would try, “in view gratitude for aid already given and friendship for America”. He also agreed I might wish try completely rewriting proposed press release⁴ so that no offense given US. Interposed no objection to suggestion issuing no press release for “reasonable time”, stating that naturally GUB wished do courteous thing in giving notice, basic ECA agreement being mutual arrangement.⁵

In view internal political difficulties summarized mytel 1792 we believe it only barely possible Prime Minister will be able persuade Cabinet reverse its decision linking TCA with KMT problem. Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Home Minister leaving Rangoon March 24 for Naga Hills meet Nehru. Will be absent two weeks.

Trager tells me Prime Minister has asked him call today. I have cautioned him confine his remarks TCA matters. Although we have heard rumor from private British source that “TCA is on the skids,” think it remarkable that no serious leak has as yet occurred here.

Sebald

1. Dated Mar. 19; it instructed Sebald to see Prime Minister Nu again, this time making it clear that he was acting on specific instructions from the Department. (690B.9321/3–1953) Sebald had not received telegram 1470, Document 51, when he talked to Nu on Mar. 19.
2. Ibid.
3. Document 52.
4. On Mar. 18, Sao Hkun Hkio handed Sebald a draft press release and invited the Department’s suggestions for its revision and time of release; Sebald reported this and sent the text to the Department on Mar. 18. (Telegrams 1776 and 1777; both 690B.9321/3–1853)
5. On Mar. 23, at the request of the Permanent Secretary of the Burmese Foreign Office, Sebald returned Sao Hkun Hkio’s letter of Mar. 17, which the Permanent Secretary stated had been cancelled, and received a new letter from Sao Hkun Hkio, dated Mar. 23, which gave notice that the Burmese Government wished to discontinue the U.S. aid program as of June 30, 1953, without stating any reason. (Telegram 1828, Mar. 23; 690B.9321/3–2353) The texts of both letters were enclosed with despatch 684 from Rangoon, Mar. 26. (890B.00 TA/3–2653) For text of the Mar. 23 letter, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1953, p. 530.