Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3::1853: Telegram

No. 51
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma

top secret
niact

Washington, March 18, 1953—7:01 p.m.

1470. Your 1783¹ and preceding. You should make every effort immediately see Prime Minister for personal discussion, making following points not as threats but simply to show inevitable consequences of proposed move.

1. It should be clear to GOB that their linking aid cancellation with KMT problem, far from encouraging US Government in efforts to help solve latter, shows such a misunderstanding of our motives in trying to be of help in this difficult problem that US will no longer be able exercise good offices in this regard with Chinese Nationalist Government and must consequently leave solution entirely in hands of GOB. This is simple statement of inevitable result of GOB action which American public opinion would interpret as highly unfriendly gesture.

2. TCA aid cannot be turned on and off like faucet pending solution of extraneous problem, and if present program is terminated it will be impossible include anything for Burma in 1954 program. Aside from bad propaganda for Burma vis-à-vis US Congress and public, you are familiar with present economy trend and consequent active competition for available funds. Burma is doing US no favor in accepting aid.

3. Rankin still pressing Chiang² to agree evacuation and subject concurrence GOB proceed with establishment investigatory body to look into practical methods of implementation. Department hopeful early favorable decision. Chiang has already agreed stop supplies and order troops cease attack. Only remaining question is agreement, at least in principle to evacuation.

This move by GOB appears based on belief it putting pressure on US solve KMT problem. Effect not only reverse but move may undo gains made thus far.

Dulles

1. Dated Mar. 18; it reiterated Sebald’s concern that unless the United States acted quickly to resolve the problem of the Nationalist troops in Burma, it risked losing Burma to Communism. (690B.9321/3–1853)

2. Telegram 713 to Taipei, Mar. 18, sent personal and eyes only for Rankin from the Under Secretary, instructed him as follows:

   “It is imperative necessity that we obtain forthwith Chinese Government agreement in principle to withdrawal forces. You should leave no stone unturned in your efforts to get immediate favorable decision. I personally hope this approach will be more effective than your previous efforts, particularly as I had impression from Madame Chiang this would be agreed upon.” (690B.9321/3–1853)