Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–1753: Telegram

No. 50
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Rangoon, March 17, 1953—5 p.m.

1772. At Foreign Minister’s request I called at Foreign Office this afternoon. After usual preliminaries and personal apologies for action he was about to take, Foreign Minister handed me letter sent mytel 1773.² After reading letter I said that it appeared to me this action ill-advised and possibly result feeling of frustration to which KMT problem has given rise in Burma. I pointed out that linking KMT activities with termination TCA program was in effect joining two entirely separate matters. If Burma wished rid itself TCA program that problem could be discussed on its merits. But to combine with KMT problem was in the nature of attempting force United States do something it already doing.

I said situation appeared to me to be following: Burma requested good offices United States find solution KMT troop problem. United States agreed and since request received has been attempting find solution on an urgent basis. Unfortunately progress not as rapid as might be hoped, but negotiations with Chinese Nationalist Government, nevertheless continuing. GUB not satisfied with results now gives notice to United States Government its desire terminate TCA agreement until KMT issue solved. It seemed to me this reasoning would merely perplex American Government and people and could not help find solution. Would in fact result hindrance negotiations now being carried on Taipei. Foreign Minister replied this matter has been under consideration for some time … and had only today been approved as proper course of action by Cabinet. He denied Government linking KMT with TCA (concerning which he spoke in highest terms of appreciation) and said intention was merely marshall all possible forces against KMTs to drive them out of Burma and also raise matter in aggressive terms in United Nations. To be receiving aid from United States Government during this painful process might be embarrassing to United States Government and might be misunderstood by other countries.

(I am inclined believe Prime Minister feels military action against Chinese Nationalist troops is wounding to United States and that continued acceptance of aid from United States under these circumstances somehow irreconcilable and immoral.)

On basis my remarks as above I suggested reconsideration contemplated action. Foreign Minister said unfortunately he now exercising mandate received from Cabinet and perforce must deliver letter to me. He promised, however, again discuss with Prime Minister this evening and in meantime agreed I should merely hold letter pending final decision. I said in any event, before decision becomes final I would wish discuss matter with Prime Minister. Foreign Minister said he would tell Prime Minister accordingly.

While I was leaving Foreign Minister said aid program would not of course, be affected if KMT troop problem solved.

Sebald

1. Repeated to Taipei by the Department.

2. Telegram 1773 from Rangoon, Mar. 17, included the text of the Foreign Minister’s letter of that date to Sebald, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:

   “As you are aware KMT activities within the territories of the Union of Burma have now assumed a character which leaves no doubt that they are fully supported and sustained by the Nationalist Government of China. This fact raises serious political problems for us and in solving these problems we consider it essential that an atmosphere is created which will leave no doubt that our efforts to expel the KMTs are genuinely motivated by the desire to rid our territories of foreign troops. The continuation of a foreign program will in our view mitigate against the creation of such an atmosphere and I am therefore to request under Article V of the Economic Cooperation Agreement between our two governments that the Government of the United States of America will accept notice that we do not desire the aid program to continue beyond June 30, 1953 until such time as the Government of the Union of Burma are able to settle the KMT issue completely.” (690B.9321/3–1753)

   The letter concluded by expressing appreciation for the materials and services received under the U.S. aid program.