Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–1653: Telegram

No. 49
The Chargé in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Taipei, March 16, 1953—5 p.m.

966. For Allison Far East. Believe no doubt has existed on part of President Chiang or Foreign Minister but that Department speaks for US Government as whole (Department telegram 700, March 13). However I have made this specific point on various occasions during current discussions regarding Chinese troops in Burma.

Comment in paragraph 4 my telegram 956, March 12 was based upon expressed readiness Chinese Government to meet two out of three US demands (numbered paragraph 8 Department’s telegram 616, February 24) and to despatch of observers to determine practicability of third. Essential difference between US (penultimate paragraph Department’s telegram 671, March 6) and Chinese Government positions therefore appears to have been narrowed down to whether establishment of joint body to be preceded by Chinese Government agreement in principle to remove troops.

Foreign Minister has been left in no doubt but that US rejects proposal to determine practicability before Chinese Government agrees in principle (Department’s telegram 659, March 5¹ and my telegram 934, March 6² first paragraph). I repeated this flatly to Foreign Minister today. He promised transmit my statement to President Chiang immediately and make further effort obtain acceptance US position.

Suggestion last paragraph Department’s telegram 700 would represent new departure. Does Department wish me to inform Chiang that refusal to agree as above would “indicate US should take new look at whole Chinese situation” regarding “present policies toward Formosa”?³

Foreign Minister is drafting general statement on Burma situation which probably will be made in name of Minister National Defense to meet increasing pressure from Yunnanese member Legislative Yuan and from press. In response to query from Foreign Minister I suggested he make statement restrained and factual as possible and avoid reference to latest reported charge by Burma Government that Americans had been associated with Li Mi’s forces.

Reference my telegram 912, March 3 summarizing March 2 meeting with General Li, attention is invited to detailed airmail report S–2–53, March 10 from ARMAT to DEPTAR⁴ which latter was requested furnish Department. ARMAT’s comments on practicability of evacuating troops are interesting view his knowledge of affected area. Otherwise information available to Embassy provides no adequate basis for forming considered independent opinion this point.

Rankin

1. Telegram 659 to Taipei stated that the Department saw no point in sending observers to the affected area, since the question was not one of the facts in the case but of the overall political implications. (690B.9321/3–553)
2. See footnote 2, Document 43.

3. The Department replied on Mar. 18, as follows:

   “Your tel 966, fourth paragraph, Department did not intend that you convey literally to Chiang phrases cited. Information was for your background and for possible use within your discretion in conveying appropriately to Chinese Government suggestion that flouting of US wishes in matter of this importance inevitably would affect climate in which future US/Chinese negotiations conducted. Our program of assistance Chinese Nationalist Government predicated on close cooperation. If such cooperation in essentials is not forthcoming, foundation of program weakened. However, this thought should not be conveyed in terms which could be construed as threat.” (Telegram 716; 690B.9321/3–1653)

4. The report is cited in footnote 2, Document 41; in it, Lattin commented that he thought an offer of safe passage to Taiwan, new uniforms, and some back pay would induce a part of Li Mi’s forces to leave Burma. (690B.9321/4–353)