690B.9321/3–353: Telegram
No. 41
The Chargé in the Republic of China
(Rankin) to the Department of State
priority
912. Conferred with General Li Mi three hours last night with Foreign Minister Yeh acting as interpreter. Army Attaché Colonel Lattin and Colonel I Fu-de1 also present. Lattin made extensive notes and will airmail detailed report.2
Li Mi said he has 26,000 troops of whom best 14,000 located east of Salween including less than 2,000 with whom he retreated from Yunnan summer of 1950. Others came out with him after abortive 1951 incursion into Yunnan. He is now receiving subsidy from Chinese Government of 200,000 Thai ticals monthly. Last payment of US $25,000 from other sources received last July. About 50 radio operators and other technicians sent to him from Formosa by air in 1951; since then no reinforcements or replacements received from anywhere although occasional stragglers or refugees join his forces. Only supplies sent to him from Formosa for more than one year came by PBYs of local Foshing Airline which land at Mong Hsat. They must carry fuel for return trip and “pay load” is only about 1 ton for each of 21 trips made to date. Usually consists largely of medical supplies and communications equipment.
Contrary to reports from Rangoon, Li Mi insisted he had not ordered attacks on Burmese. His standing orders from Generalissimo forbid it and he not only has no desire make such attacks but no purpose doing so. Recent clashes, which he indicates have been grossly exaggerated began last summer after return of Burmese mission from Peking. Reversing previous custom of avoiding contact, Burmese began harassing Chinese Nationalist Forces, especially ambushing small unarmed groups and in one case turning over 100 captives to Chinese Communists for slaughter. His forces being guerrillas and under loose discipline occasionally got out of hand and retaliated but this small scale and against his orders.
Li Mi said only about 1,000 Burmese troops east of Salween. They are deployed along East-West Road; he could wipe them out anytime but had no desire do so. General Li gave detailed order of [Page 62] battle in Burma using large-scale maps showing positions and strength throughout country of forces of Burmese Government, red flag, white flag, Karens, Chinese Nationalists, etc., emphasizing that Burmese held chiefly main lines of communications (“where they could protect British interests”). He evidently considers position of Burmese Government virtually hopeless vis-à-vis Communists and in fact believes Thakin Nu Communist sympathizer. Withdrawal or dissolution of Chinese Nationalist guerrilla forces would remove last serious obstacle to Communist take-over in Li’s opinion.
I reviewed to General Li instructions received from Department and already transmitted to Generalissimo. He replied it useless to order his forces out of Burma except for return to Yunnan to fight; they would not understand and would not obey. Particularly since outside aid reduced to trickle (which “would not support 20,000 chickens”) his men forced fend for themselves. Some work for Karens, many are farming, large proportion either have families with them from Yunnan or have set up households with native women; Formosa is to them foreign land of which they as Yunnanese know nothing. They want to stay where they are until they can return home. In fact he believed his forces could survive as guerrillas even if Communists should overrun southeast Asia. He had told Generalissimo all this and said he would not transmit orders to evacuate since he knew it to be useless.
Looking at order of battle on map, Foreign Minister remarked Chinese Nationalist and Burmese forces so disposed there seemed no reason for them to clash; also that only sizable anti-Communist forces anywhere near most of Yunnan border were Chinese Nationalists and their withdrawal would leave it wide open.
In conclusion General Li urged sending American observers to obtain true picture. Possibility their being accompanied by official Burmese observer was discussed and Li Mi had no objection. (This later cleared with President Chiang who would welcome such American inspection with Burmese observer attached.)