Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–953: Telegram

No. 44
The Chargé in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Taipei, March 9, 1953—7 p.m.

941. Foreign Minister received lengthy telegram yesterday from Ambassador Koo re his talk March 6 with Under Secretary Smith on Chinese troops in Burma. Meanwhile, I had already given Foreign Minister substance Deptel 671, March 6, which received after his oral statement (mytel 936, March 8).¹

General Chou Chih-jou and Foreign Minister expect see Generalissimo together sometime today and will let me know result. I hazard guess they may come up with new attempt meet Department’s request for withdrawal order, although this may not materialize today. Chinese Government might approve formation joint Chinese-US–Burmese body to visit territory and report on number Chinese troops practicable to evacuate and how this could be done. Chinese Government might then agree to such removal to extent which had been found practicable. Note distinction between advance agreement to removal in principle and practical agreement after feasibility determined.

This general subject extensively covered in telegraphic exchanges recent weeks but several aspects have been treated only by implication or incidentally. May be useful outline here some of less tangible points which particularly disturb Chinese Government and therefore influence official thinking here:

1. Chinese do not believe Burmese intend bring matter before UNO but are threatening do so simply to influence US.

2. For Generalissimo to issue withdrawal order to troops in Burma would reverse official position Chinese believe they have followed quite consistently past three years. While avoiding any open repudiation of Li Mi and his forces, they maintained latter not under effective control of Chinese Government (high Chinese official recently described this to me as “85 percent true.”) They have preferred keep situation rather fluid in hope exploiting it when opportunity arose.

3. Failure any appreciable number troops to obey Generalissimo’s withdrawal order would involve serious loss of face for latter both throughout free world and in mainland China.

4. Chinese regard US thinking as short term, having in mind fluctuations of US policy re China in general and Burma-Yunnan area in particular. They envisage situation developing next six months or year when US would welcome opportunity to support Li Mi in invasion of Yunnan as part of some coordinated plan. Chinese Government would like keep his forces in being and maintain some influence over them for such eventuality.

5. Chinese do not regard invasion of Yunnan in light mentioned second paragraph Deptel 663, March 5.² They refer to us favoring such action in 1951 and maintain inadequate arms primary cause failure that summer.

6. While not wishing raise matter formally at this time, Chinese look upon Burmese claims to some of affected territory as ill-founded while much of remainder they regard as regions to which Burma has not particular right on basis either population or effective control. In short they look upon it at present as kind of no-man’s land.

7. Chinese appear convinced present agitation started and maintained by Communists for own purposes, probably looking to deal with Burma Government which might involve entry of Communists into government and/or joint military action of Burma Government and Communists against Chinese and other elements, followed by complete Red takeover when various anti-Communist elements brought under control.

We have no satisfactory means here in Taipei of evaluating considerations such as foregoing. However, it may now be appropriate revive Sebald’s proposal (Rangoon’s 879 to Department Nov 26)³ for meeting in Bangkok. I am ready to go there or elsewhere any time Department considers such gathering useful.

Rankin

1. Telegram 936 reported the text of the oral statement which the Foreign Minister handed to Howard P. Jones, Counselor of Embassy, on Mar. 7. It stated that Li Mi agreed that a fact-finding mission of U.S. officers, including non-Communist Burmese members and accompanied by Li Mi himself, should visit his troops in Burma to determine the practicality of withdrawing them. While this was under discussion, the Chinese Government undertook to persuade Li Mi to confine his troops where they were deployed and to refrain from taking any offensive action against Burmese Government troops. In addition, the Chinese Government declared it would suspend its monthly subsidy to Li Mi for the purchase of medical supplies, it would do its best to stop the raising of private funds for the purpose of supplying Li’s troops, and it would give no clearance to any further flights to the area where the troops were based from any airfield on Taiwan. (690B.9321/3–853)
2. Telegram 663 replied to telegram 919 from Taipei, Mar. 5, which reported the position the Chinese planned to take if Burma raised the issue in the United Nations, including the statement that the Chinese Government had repeatedly instructed the troops in Burma to return to Yunnan. (690B.9321/3–553) Telegram 663 commented that this statement “while perhaps true would be regarded as ludicrous in view fact Chinese Government exercises no authority in Yunnan. In fact when KMT troops did attempt return to Yunnan they were completely routed by Chinese Communists.” (690B.9321/3553)
3. Telegram 879 proposed a meeting between Sebald, Rankin, and Stanton to explore possibilities of dealing with the problem of the Nationalist troops in Burma and to recommend action for the Department’s consideration. (690B.9321/11–2652) Since the Department of State had already initiated action on the subject, the meeting did not take place.