Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–653: Telegram

No. 43
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

top secret
priority

Washington, March 6, 1953—7:29 p.m.

671. Re your 934.² Chinese Ambassador called in by Under Secretary Smith this afternoon and told that after thorough study of whole problem of KMT troops in Burma it had been determined that on balance most acceptable solution of problem is for Chinese Government to agree at once that troops should be ordered out of Burma. Under Secretary informed Koo that this matter had been discussed with President and Secretary and that it was desire of US Government that Chinese take necessary action as soon as possible. It was pointed out that it would be futile for US to make further representations to Burmese Government to keep matter out of UN unless it could inform latter officially at least that Chinese had agreed in principle to removal of troops. If this agreement in principle can be communicated to Burmese, US will make strongest efforts to get them to postpone presentation of matter to UN and will announce its willingness to assist in all proper manner to implement Chinese decision.

Under Secretary also emphasized that it was most reasonable for Generalissimo to want to concentrate his forces on Formosa. Koo was informed that US would be willing to make representations to Burmese Government to the end that troops in Burma would be given safe conduct out of country and that if it should not prove possible or desirable to bring all their equipment with them it might be that equivalent equipment could be provided upon their arrival in Formosa.

Koo was told that Burmese Ambassador to US, who has been ordered back to Rangoon to discuss problem of presenting matter to UN, would visit Department afternoon March 9 and it would be most helpful if prior to his visit Chinese Government had agreed in principle to US request. In such case Department would make strenuous efforts to get Burmese Ambassador to recommend that his Government not proceed with matter in UN. The US would use its good offices with Burmese Government to negotiate agreement on how troops can be removed safely. Ambassador was also told in strict confidence that if necessary US Government could probably obtain some funds for assistance in providing shipping to take troops back to Formosa.

You should approach Foreign Minister along similar lines to the above and urge speedy action. If Chinese will agree in principle to removal of troops and to US making this known officially to Burmese Government, request comments of Taipei and Rangoon on possible formation joint Burmese-Chinese-US commission which could negotiate matter and if necessary visit territory where troops are to determine what most practicable steps would be. US recognizes that implementation of any such agreement would take considerable time but is convinced that unless some definite action is taken Burmese cannot be persuaded to keep matter out of UN.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Allison and cleared with Under Secretary Smith; repeated to Rangoon.
2. Telegram 934 from Taipei, Mar. 6, reported that Yeh saw Chiang and was drafting a statement on the subject of the troops in Burma which he proposed to give to Rankin orally; the telegram listed the major points to be included in the statement. For a summary of the oral statement, see footnote 1, infra.