Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–453: Telegram

No. 42
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

top secret
niact

Washington, March 4, 1953—11:15 a.m.

654. Department has thoroughly considered factors brought out your 912² and 913.³ Certain information contained those messages at variance with other information available to this Government. While Department realizes rights in this case are not wholly on one side nevertheless it has determined that on balance over-all US interests are better served if Chinese Government issues orders to Li Mi to evacuate Burma and that these orders be made public.

If this done at once Department will make every effort persuade Burmese Government not bring matter up in UN and will, if you believe helpful, issue statement commending action Chinese Government and expressing willingness US Government help in any way possible in implementing instructions issued by Chinese Government.

Department’s position based on firm conviction that one of most effective methods of encouraging Burmese Government to continue resist communist infiltration is to remove any possible cause for Burmese claim US action or lack thereof has contributed to its difficulties and made it more difficult for Government Burma fight communism. In this connection Burmese Prime Minister March 2 informed visiting US writer,⁴ among other things, that “Failure US disavow KMT and move effectively to halt KMT depredations will result in loss of Burma to free world, since continuation present situation will alienate people of Burma and undermine present government.” Department remains opinion expressed previously that retention Chinese Nationalist guerrilla forces in Burma, rather than constituting serious obstacle to Communist takeover, would in fact be probable cause such takeover by making possible subversion present non-Communist Burmese Government.

You are therefore instructed carry out at once Department’s previous instructions and obtain Chinese Government agreement to points a, b and c Department’s 616. If this action to be effective with respect preventing matter from being taken up in detail in UN it must be taken at once and you should therefore impress upon Chinese Government urgent desire US Government in this respect.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Allison and cleared with Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, among others. Henry B. Day, Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, wrote on Mar. 25, to R. Austin Acly, First Secretary of Embassy in Rangoon, that “a great deal of the telegraphing back and forth between here and Taipei has been handled directly by Mr. Allison, sometimes under direct instruction and guidance of General Smith.” (Rangoon Post files, lot 56 F 193)
2. Supra.
3. In telegram 913, Mar. 4, Rankin commented that Li Mi’s presentation, as far as the Embassy was able to judge, was substantially factual, and he reported that Yeh told him if the matter was brought up formally in the United Nations, his government would have no alternative to disavowing the troops in Burma and making a “full and frank” statement disclosing “chaotic conditions” in Burma. Rankin requested that the Department review items a, b, and c and the subsequent paragraph at the end of telegram 616 to Taipei (Document 39) in light of Li Mi’s statement and Yeh’s remarks. (690B.9321/3–453)
4. Nu’s comments in the interview were reported in telegram 1664 from Rangoon, Mar. 3. (611.90B/3–353)