690B.9321/2–2253: Telegram
No. 39
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in the Republic of
China
top
secret
priority
priority
Washington, February 24, 1953—7:54
p.m.
616. Limited distribution. Your telegram 878.1 Continue press matter urgently. In so doing, following points should be stressed:
- 1.
- Emphasize that request by this Government for Chinese Govt. cooperation this matter is not inconsistent with policy of seizing initiative against Communism. US policy does not envisage undermining authority friendly, non-Communist Government such as Burmese.
- 2.
- There has recently been marked increase in number verified hostile acts by Chinese troops against Burmese. Whereas previously such incidents more or less isolated as these troops appeared avoid contact Burmese armed forces, since December their policy seems to have shifted in direction of taking offensive against Burmese.
- 3.
- Concerning reliability reports that these troops have been concentrating efforts against Burmese rather than against Communists, while allowing for certain exaggerations in Burmese press, Department has sufficient information from reliable sources to be convinced that attacks against Burmese are in fact going on. Essential veracity these reports confirmed by Burmese War Office, and other official sources as well as by private American citizens in area involved, and accepted by our Embassy in Rangoon.
- 4.
- Hostile acts against Burmese towns and army units have effect of diverting Burmese troops from fighting Burmese Communist insurgents, thus weakening Burmese efforts against our common enemy and presenting painful spectacle of troops two countries which should be concentrating on mission fighting Communists fighting each other instead.
- 5.
- United States cannot believe free Chinese policy supports hostile acts against non-Communist Govt in utter disregard its sovereignty. [Page 59] Moreover US does not see how troops engaged in marauding acts deep within Burma are providing effective support Yunnanese resistance against Communists and thus fails to see how withdrawal these troops from Burma would significantly weaken such resistance.
- 6.
- US objective Burma is to restore stability which indispensable if that country is to be prevented from falling victim to Communist imperialism. While presumably objective Chinese troops in Burma has been to bolster resistance people of Yunnan to Communism, an objective with which US fully sympathizes, facts as available to US Govt demonstrate that these troops have not accomplished this objective but have succeeded only in seriously threatening stability Burma. Thus whatever original merits of Chinese troops mission, seriously deteriorating situation Burma now calls for immediate remedial action.
- 7.
- To this end necessary obtain firm assurance from Chiang now that he will issue evacuation orders once arrangements have been worked out with Burmese and Thai Governments (re Burmese attitude see Rangoon’s 1572, February 19,2 being repeated Taipei 609). Only with such assurance can Burmese and Thai Governments be approached with specific proposals.
- 8.
- Importance Chiang’s cooperation in implementing evacuation
proposals does not hinge on number troops evacuated but on
evidence such cooperation will supply to Burmese and Thai
Governments that Chinese Government recognizes untenable
position of Chinese troops Burma is threat to stability and
security of area and will do its best to remedy situation.
Concrete evidence this attitude should be demonstrated by:
- (a)
- Immediate orders directing troops cease attacks against Burmese targets;
- (b)
- Agreeing evacuate as many troops as possible;
- (c)
- Preventing further supplies reaching troops from outside Burma.
Necessity that Chiang take action this matter rendered more imperative by strong possibility Burmese Government will bring matter before this General Assembly (Rangoon’s 1572) unless there is some immediate evidence of positive corrective action.
Dulles