Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/2–2253: Telegram

No. 38
The Chargé in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Taipei, February 22, 1953—3 p.m.

878. In response instructions reported my telegram 846, February 16,¹ Li Mi was expected return Formosa yesterday. Bad flying weather delayed travel but he telegraphed General Chou² he would come by first available plane.

Complying Department telegram 597, February 19, I flew to Kaohsiung yesterday with Wang Shih-chieh³ and Ewing.⁴ Talked with President Chiang one hour yesterday afternoon and again at dinner last night. After citing various hostile acts allegedly committed by Nationalist troops and evidences Communist infiltration into their ranks as reported from Rangoon, I conveyed contents Department telegram 597 almost textually to Chiang. (Method evacuating troops suggested Department telegram 524, January 30, previously communicated to President and General Chou through Foreign Minister.)

Chiang replied to points raised Department telegram 597 substantially as follows:

1. We are asking him do the impossible in expecting issuance immediate unqualified orders for withdrawal without knowing whether such withdrawal practicable. He was referring to unknown attitude of Burmese and Thai Governments and to his limited authority over Nationalist “guerrillas” in Burma including even Li Mi. He would not issue such orders unless he believed they could be carried out.

2. Withdrawal of Li Mi forces would be painful, particularly because of effect on Yunnan people who look to Li Mi for eventual salvation.

3. Retreat of this kind at present time was contrary to Free Chinese policy and presumably to that of new US administration which seeks resume initiative.

4. Removal of Li Mi and perhaps 2,000 men under his immediate authority would not help situation in North Burma, since such control as Li Mi able exert over additional 10,000 loosely organized guerrillas would end and Communists left free field.

5. Chiang does not believe most stories circulating re misbehavior Nationalist forces in Burma. He suspects these reports are stimulated by British and others to make trouble between US and Chinese Nationalist Governments and to cover up troubles for which Chinese Nationalist troops under Li Mi not responsible.

6. He has sent for Li Mi urgently and is convinced no decisions should be made prior latter’s arrival in Formosa.

I replied along following lines:

1. Li Mi recognizes only President Chiang as his superior and whatever authority exists is therefore in his hands.

2. I realized only limited number of men could be evacuated but that it was important to disassociate Chinese Nationalist Government much as possible from situation in North Burma which now apparently developing to advantage only of Communists.

3. If Li Mi forces were actually in Yunnan situation would be different, but they reportedly are in Burma much nearer Thailand than Yunnan frontier and not even in “undefined” border area between Burma and Yunnan. Troops are in territory of country with which US maintains friendly relations and which we hope can be weaned away from Communist influences.

4. This was first important request to Chinese Government from new US administration, and even if Chiang convinced he was right and we wrong I considered it would be wise for him to yield.

5. He had made incidental reference possible “insistence” on part of US. I remarked that character of my instructions was distinctly one of insistence.

Chiang responded that he would give us an answer but could not do so before he saw Li Mi.

Later in evening Chiang told me he was considering counter proposals which would satisfy Burmese. I said I would transmit any such proposals.

Comment: I believe case has been put to Chiang as strongly as possible with material at my disposal. Although this matter has been at issue between US and Chinese Government for at least three years, during which time our policy has varied considerably more than that of Chinese Government, this Embassy has never been kept informed officially of real facts. We have had to proceed on basis of instructions which were at times almost incomprehensible, of reports from Chinese sources and from accidental American contacts plus scattered and often doubtful information relayed from Rangoon and elsewhere. There must be available to the US Government reliable information as to the true facts which we should have in presenting our case.

Li Mi of course denies that his troops have taken food without payment, or have operated with Karens against Burmese forces, or have committed other hostile acts which unconfirmed reports from Rangoon allege. He would say that these are either propaganda or the work of elements which would contrive to operate in such manner or worse if his troops withdrawn. All of this not germane to principle involved but does affect questions of urgency and procedure.

I shall continue follow matter urgently with Chinese Government.

Rankin

1. See footnote 1, Document 36.
2. Lt. Gen. Chou Chih-jou, Chief of General Staff, Chinese Armed Forces.
3. Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General, Office of the President.
4. Richard T. Ewing, Second Secretary of Embassy in Taipei.