Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

INR–NIE files

¹

No. 37
National Intelligence Estimate²

secret
NIE–74

[Washington,] 20 February 1953.

Probable Developments In Burma Through 1953³

the problem

To estimate probable developments in Burma through 1953, and Communist intentions and capabilities with respect to Burma during that period.

conclusions

1. Internal security and economic conditions have improved in Burma during the past year. The prospects through 1953 are for a slight improvement in internal security and economic and political stability.

2. Communist and other insurgent groups still dominate numerous areas of Burma, and have the capability of conducting guerrilla raids in many parts of the country.

3. The Burmese Government’s progress in reducing the Communist insurgents is impeded by the necessity of stationing troops to contain the former Chinese Nationalist troops in northeastern Burma. The government also fears that the presence of these troops, which have made forays into Yunnan, may provide a pretext for Chinese Communist intervention in Burma. Finally, the presence of these troops complicates Burmese relations with the US and its relationship with the West in the UN because many Burmese Government leaders believe that these troops are indirectly supported by the US.

4. There is little prospect that the government can achieve either a military decision over the Karen insurgents or a political settlement with Karen leaders during the period of this estimate. Fullscale military cooperation between the Karen insurgents and the former Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma would seriously weaken the government’s capability of dealing with insurgency throughout Burma. The likelihood of such a development cannot be estimated with confidence. However, we believe that the apparent divergence of ultimate purposes between these groups would make full-scale military cooperation against the Government of Burma unlikely during the period of this estimate.

5. Present Chinese Communist assistance to the Burmese Communists appears to be very slight. There is no evidence that the Chinese Communists have begun a program of equipping the Burmese Communist guerrillas. However, the Chinese Communists have the capability of providing them with extensive military aid.

6. If an extensive program of Chinese Communist military aid were initiated in the near future, the Burmese Communist guerrillas could undertake offensive operations to expand their territory in 1953 but would probably not be able to seize control of a substantial amount of additional territory during the period of this estimate. A continuing program of extensive Chinese Communist aid might, in the longer run, pose a serious threat to the government’s position.

7. We believe that the Chinese Communists are unlikely to exercise their capability to invade Burma during 1953.

8. The Burmese Communists will probably emphasize political tactics during 1953 while continuing guerrilla operations and maintaining a hard-core guerrilla force for expanded operations at some future date.

9. Assuming no substantial shift in the East-West power balance in Asia, the Burmese Government will probably continue through 1953 its efforts to maintain “normal” relations with Communist China and to maintain neutrality in the East-West struggle. However, Burma will probably continue to accept the assistance of the West in strengthening its armed forces and its economy.

[Here follows the “Discussion” portion of the paper comprising paragraphs 10–38.]

1. Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates, retained by the Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
2. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.
3. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 12 February 1953.”