756D.11/2–254: Telegram

No. 258
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State

secret

828. Limited distribution. During Vice President Nixon’s visit to Indonesia last October he and I discussed the possibility of inviting President Sukarno to the US at a propitious time. I have kept this matter in mind and have now formed the opinion that we should actively consider such an invitation. In making this recommendation, the following are the considerations which I believe favor such a step:

1.
It would be appropriate to extend an invitation to the President or Vice President of Indonesia as return courtesy for Vice President Nixon’s visit here and not too much time should elapse if any advantage is to be taken of the reciprocal courtesy.
2.
Vice President Hatta should not be actively considered because of the delicate political position which he now occupies in the country and the obvious danger of US being attacked for openly cultivating him at a time when he is unofficially recognized as being in opposition to elements within present government even while being vice president.
3.
Trends in Indonesian foreign policy are such that we might be embarrassed in extending high courtesy to Sukarno after Indonesia has progressed further along the road of recalcitrance toward the US from which it would be difficult to disassociate him as president.
4.
There is a chance that Sukarno can be favorably impressed and the attempt well worthwhile before he has committed himself too far in direction of moral support of his current governments “neutrality” policy.
5.
President Sukarno suffers from lack of contact with outside world. Whatever his limited travel may have been before coming into prominence, he has not been out of the country except for a brief visit to India and the Philippines since taking over his responsibilities as President of Indonesia. Indos in general have a center of the universe complex and the president shares this national characteristic to a degree, but being a person with natural acquisitive [Page 408] tendencies and wide interests he would benefit greatly by this broadening experience.
6.
The US need not consider adverse results from his absence from the country as Vice President Hatta would naturally be in charge during his absence. In event of emergencies arising, his non-Communist attitude would ensure against actions detrimental to our interests at least during the President’s absence.
7.
In putting forth this maximum psychological effort we must not underestimate President’s personal proclivity for limelight and public recognition. In my estimation he would be impressed by the strength of America, its progress, and would, I feel, react favorably to the reception which he would receive in US by the President, Vice President and other high officials. Sukarno has undoubted charm, dignity and the sort of appeal which would get the type of response from the American public which would in turn favorably impress him. In this critical period we must not forget the great personal prestige of the President and the extent of his personal influence at all levels in Indonesia. If such an effort at this time would be successful it might turn out to be just what was needed to tide us over this critical period until the normal course of political events and the elections provide an opportunity for political elements more favorable to US to assert themselves.

It is my thought that should the foregoing meet with the approval in principle of the Department and the President, I be given an indication of the most suitable dates and authorized to explore the matter informally with the Prime Minister or perhaps President Sukarno himself. If the reaction is favorable we may draw some benefit therefrom; if the reaction is unfavorable, we would have the basis for formulating certain conclusions re trends in Indonesian policy and President Sukarno’s attitude towards US.

In view of Vice President Nixon’s interest in this matter I would appreciate this telegram being shown to him.

Cumming