756D.5 MSP/2–1852: Telegram
No. 190
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State
niact
1220. Embtel 11191 indicated possibility Sukiman govt might fall result accumulation domestic factors, but effort wld be made tie crisis to one of internatl problems, such as Hague or Tokyo negots or charges of violation independent policy. Chance struck our MSA issue. Embtel 12171 reported MSA assurances to be subj Parliament interpellation on or after Feb 25. Embtel 12191 reported PNI had taken position which practically dooms Sukiman govt by early resignation or defeat on vote confidence. In circumstances submit fol summary developments with suggestions. (Emb preparing statement for issuance at Secy’s press conf if and when Sukiman govt falls.)
When I approached FonOff early Dec to obtain MSA assurances I let Subardjo know of course possibilities of both (a) and (b) assurances. We decided my note should set forth assurances under (a) since these wld permit Indo receive undelivered balance police constabulary equipment without commencing pay therefor and wld insure Indo eligibility receive mil aid if this shld be sought in future, without negotiating new agreement in possibly urgent circumstances. I was particularly anxious avoid situation with respect police equipment which might involve revelation agreement Hatta entered into honorably with me on this subj, but which might now embarrass him if his assumption sole responsibility therefor questioned. Above all I felt eventual mil aid to Indo might be critically needed and that it was to defensive interest US to see that possibility [Page 267] now. Dept is aware of situations which give reason for grave concern on this point.
After giving Subardjo tentative draft note Dec 11 I questioned him once or twice each week seeking reaction thereto. When I was prodding him for action he frequently said he wld let me hear after next cabinet mtg. Final phase of negotiation related Embtel 963, Jan 7. Even then I was not aware FonMin had not consulted cabinet. I knew he had approval PriMin. I was of course cognizant hesitancy Sukiman approve “free world”. I realized risk being taken in its inclusion. I thought very much worthwhile, however, make this attempt draw Indo one step nearer “free world” and prevent backsliding to level of Burma. FonOff emissaries were told by me at final discussion text of note that I wld recommend US go along with idea Indos on interpretation of “free world” if necessity shld arise.
When Subardjo approached me in regard his difficulties over undertakings, I promptly telegraphed Dept and obtained auth for interpretative note or alternatives. Subardjo and I both favored interpretative note. He chose consult cabinet for approval idea and wording interpretative note. On recent mtgs with Subardjo have offered be of any assistance but he has said nothing I cld do pending outcome cabinet deliberations and party confs (Deptel 885).2 Am informed cabinet night Feb 15 did not consider MSA question.
If and when govt falls presume question will be determined whether Indo stands by undertaking assigned by Subardjo or repudiates it. In latter event MSA aid shld technically cease at once. Failure successive Indo Govt submit for ratification basic ECA agreement negotiated Oct 1950 is evidence lack enthusiasm on part Indo auths risk debate on acceptance aid from US. Developments past few weeks have shown complete failure Indos grasp sense of mutuality of interest envisaged by MSA Act 1951. In present crisis not one official Indo voice has been raised in behalf friendship for US.
Recommend strongly against any substitute arrangement on assurances. If Indonesia repudiates Subardjo’s undertakings in manner which appears to have been chosen, believe it absolutely inconsistent with American officials dignity and with spirit congressional legislation to work out anything less with this country. Indonesians did not seek economic aid from us in beginning, are sufficiently independent financially not to require it, are not appreciative of it, are not absorbing it satisfactorily, and in my opinion are not warranted in receiving it further.
[Page 268]It should be noted that PNI Party decision included “appreciation with Sukiman-Subardjo Cabinet’s decision to reject Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of USA.” This puts PNI on record approving note Jan 23 giving Indonesian position on Battle Act (Embtel 1054)3 which emanated from Ministry Economic Affairs under PNI Wilopo. Do not see how we could possibly think of any further compromise on MSA assurances to perpetuate even economic aid if govt and party leaders defy our ideas of control under Battle Act. See Embtel 1221 urging firm stand in tin negotiations.4
Unless Indonesia willing stand by Subardjo undertaking I believe best interests US Govt will be achieved and best possibility for friendly relations with Indonesia assured if STEM liquidated earliest possible date. Any further consideration aid of any sort for Indonesia shld only follow official and political Indonesian request therefor, on Indonesians’ own initiative. We shld then take into account overall attitude Indonesian Govt toward US interests.