756D.5 MSP/2–1952: Telegram

No. 191
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State

secret
priority

1227. Visited Subardjo for hour his home night 18th his request. He told me he was to present his documentary and oral explanation of negots on MSA assurances at cabinet mtg evening 19th. We discussed various points in preparation therefor. Fol instrs contained Deptel 885,1 I explored means by which I cld possibly be of help to FonMin in defending his position.

Subardjo had recd reports of MSA agreements negotiated with India, Burma and Pak. He found, as I had advised him in advance, these were for econ aid, and assurances more along line 511 (b) than (a). Subardjo promptly said conditions those Commonwealth countries much different from Indo. He understood that all had facilities for manufacturing arms while isolated Indo had practically nothing. He also assumed that such countries cld have special facilities for procuring mil equip from UK. We discussed difficulties [Page 269] being experienced by Indo endeavoring procure mil equip UK through straight commercial channels. We also talked of troubles met by Col. Hidayit when he headed mission to Eur seeking arms and ammo. Fol failure this mission Hidayit now leaving army for civil employment.

Subardjo insisted he and I had been working in best interests Indo in providing for assurances which wld take care possibility Indo obtaining mil aid. He said Sukarto had protested to him he wld resign as chief civil police if provision Amer equip were cut off. Subardjo thought it wld be policy of weakness for any Indo govt withdraw from assurances now given and seek watered-down 511 (b) arrangement whereunder small amount econ aid wld be recd. He deprecated need for financial aid in view Indos large dollar balances. He expresses strong fear of US official and Congressional reaction if Indo actually needing mil equip wld seek escape from prescribed assurances and still look to US for providing aid in emergency, notwithstanding severe suspicion and criticism of US policies and intentions expressed in present crisis.

I volunteered give Subardjo written acceptance today if he wished give me interpretative note of character we discussed before. It was understood he wld deliver note in ample time for me give reply he cld use at cabinet mtg.2 He sought no other alternatives. I told him Dept had confirmed correctness my statement to him that he shld not mix Battle Act and UN embargo with MSA assurances. He grasped idea and said he did not ask we permit him give any interpretation of MSA assurances which wld cause confusion with Battle Act.

FonMin told me unlikely decision be taken by cabinet tonight on policy it shld pursue re MSA assurances. He said PriMin has been sick past five days but hopes be able meet with cabinet. In meantime effort being made get Masjumi Council meet before end month and overrule decision Masjumi exec controlled by Natsir and Roem with respect disapproval Subardjo action. FonMin said that notwithstanding position taken by PNI exec (Embtel 1219)3 he understood PNI wld not insist on his quitting if Pres Sukarno approved his staying. He said one idea being toyed with is for Sukiman return mandate to President who wld immed ask him form [Page 270] new cabinet, which wld be done with elimination PIR members. Subardjo thought cabinet might be forced take final decision night Feb 22 as to whether they resign or await parl interpellation on MSA. He hoped, however, issue cld be put off until end Feb, giving time for further progress at Hague and for mtg Masjumi council.

Cochran
  1. Document 189.
  2. The exchange of notes was conveyed to the Department of State in telegram 1233 from Djakarta, Feb 19. (756D.5 MSP/2–1952) The United States agreed to two interpretations set forth by the Government of Indonesia regarding clause 3 of Article 1 of the note of Jan. 4 (see footnote 2, Document 178). “The defensive strength of the free world” was interpreted to mean “the defensive strength of independent, sovereign nations”, and the word “permitted” was interpreted to mean “permitted, as determined by the Government of Indonesia”.

    The Indonesian note was dated Jan. 5 and the U.S. note Feb. 19.

  3. Not printed.