Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.5 MSP/2–1152: Telegram

No. 184
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State

confidential
priority

Djakarta, February 11, 1952—5 p.m.

1165. Called on FonMin Subardjo 8 a.m. today. He told me of PIR demand for his resignation (Embtel 1161).¹ As authorized by para 2 Deptel 856, I told Subardjo that interpretative note explaining relevant portion text MSA note as meaning “defensive strength of free independent nations” wld be acceptable.² I talked against any alternatives. Subardjo said he was to see Pres Sukarno 6 p.m. today. He was still worried over charge by Minister Defense³ that mil officers from my staff had discussed agreement. He asked I cld give him letter to use with cabinet.

FonMin phoned at 1:15 p.m. and asked I see him 3 p.m. Djuanda came to my house 2 p.m. his request. I showed him letter I planned give Subardjo which reads as fols:

“May I refer to our conversation in which you inquired as to purpose of visit made few days ago by two mil officers from Emb staff upon Min Defense. You particularly asked whether these officers may have been under instructions to discuss developments with respect to requirement by my govt of assurances from those fon govts which may be given aid under MSA Act 1951.

I am pleased to give you fol facts. On Jan. 30, Lt. Cols. Beach and Nestlerode of mil staff came to see me. Lt. Col. Nestlerode had arrived from US only few days previously to relieve Col. Beach, who terminated his tour of duty and departed for US on Feb. 9. Col. Beach showed me msg from his Hqs in Washington re an application for issuance of commercial license for export of considerable number truck tires to Indo for Indo Min Defense. US Dept of Army requested confirmation as to need for such tires. This was purely routine matter.

I phoned Secy Gen Ali Budiardjo of Min Defense and told him of msg I had recd. I asked with whom my officers shld get in touch. He gave me name of a Mr. Idam (or Idham), in his ministry, who, Dr. Budiardjo said had been in US in 1951 in regard to purchase of tires, and was entirely familiar with question. This info was passed on by me to Cols Beach and Nestlerode.

Col. Nestlerode informs me that he and Col. Beach were recd by Mr. Idam, in presence of a mil officer, on Jan. 31. He states they obtained info necessary to reply telegraphically to inquiry of Dept of Army in Wash. Neither Col. Beach nor Col. Nestlerode was familiar with negots which have been taking place between your min and my Emb on matter of assurances under Mutual Security Act of 1951, and neither cld have discussed this question with authority. I am informed by Col. Nestlerode that question where obtain army truck tires most expeditiously arose, and the Amer officers pointed out advantages of working through mil rather than commercial channels.

As you aware, there have been occasional conversations between ourselves, and between other reps of our govts, over past two years as to manner in which Indo might procure mil equipment from US, on reimbursable basis. This question came up long before passage of Mutual Security Act of 1951. Your govt has been given pertinent info on this subj from time to time, and as conditions and rules have changed. Mil officers on my staff realize, and have consistently informed Indo officers who have approached them, that any overall arrangements for procurement of mil equipment on reimbursable basis are left to our respective FonOffs and Embs, and that officers in question can only be of assistance in working out technical details within framework of any agreements that may be consummated at top level.

I assure you that my Emb is ready to be of any possible and appropriate service that your Govt may request in its efforts to achieve stability and security. In accordance with internal practice, Emb deals directly with your FonOff when overall arrangement to meet Indos needs and requests are undertaken.”

Djuanda thought this wld help explain Subardjo’s position but feared it wld not be sufficient check polit attacks against govt which may possibly result in its overthrow. He said Roem had come to him Sat afternoon⁴ to sound him out on prospects for Cabinet which Hatta⁵ wld advocate to be headed by Sultan Jogja. Roem intimated both Natsir⁶ and Sjahrir⁷ wld work with such org. Djuanda said he had been cautious in responding to Roem not knowing what all might be involved. He expressed conviction to Roem, however, that such cabinet wld be too strongly under influence Socialists. Djuanda said understood Masjumi Party leaders met Sunday night and decided take same position as PIR with respect Subardjo (if Masjumi and PIR both refuse support Subardjo in Cabinet, this means also Sukiman wld have to go since PriMin let it be known he had been cognizant of Subardjo’s negots and had approved them). Djuanda states this crisis is purely one of internal politics maneuvered principally by Socialists. He pointed out that Idam mentioned in my letter is one of Sjahrir’s closest associates.

Djuanda said he also thought he shld tell me that on Saturday night Makatita, who is one of Darmawan’s assistants on coordinating committee for foreign aid, came to his house. Djuanda said Makatita told him Hayes of ECA⁸ had let him know it was not necessary for Indo to give assurances under 511 a to have econ aid, assurances under 511 b sufficing therefor. Djuanda said this was very dangerous since it played directly into hands enemies of govt. He asked if I had explained to Hayes that there had been a confidential agreement on police equipment.⁹ I told him I had explained this carefully to Hayes and I added that if Indo shld now want to choose 511 b assurances and question of paying for balance of police equipment arises it wld be inevitable that arrangements I made with Hatta wld come to debate. I asked Djuanda if Hayes’ talk with Makatita had been recent. He said he definitely gained impression it had been quite recent.

I told Djuanda I naturally wanted to help Indo retain all present assistance that it may really desire, and also be eligible for mil aid of any kind in any future emergency, without necessity arising later for hurried debate and possible difficulties in achieving new agreement. Recd by Subardjo 3 p.m. He told me had been questioned during forenoon by PNI leaders, was to be questioned by Masjumi leaders at 5 p.m., and then go to Sukarno at 6 p.m. I gave him letter above quoted. He thought this very explicit and shld be helpful. I told him I did not see what more I cld do at this juncture. He agreed I shld make no public statement on subject of issue between Indo polit factions. I said both he and I had realized throughout negots desirability of having agreement which wld permit mil aid. We also realized that there wld be certain polit repercussions whenever agreement terms announced. I hoped idea or explanatory note and utilization my letter might enable govt overcome objections.

Subardjo said PNI leaders had asked if India, Pakistan and Burma, had signed MSA agreements. I replied in affirmative, but said, I did not have text thereof. He explained that text of assurances he had given me had not been transmitted by me to other missions. I warned him against any statement that those countries had agreed to 511 a assurances.

Subardjo told me PNI were inclined to interpret para 3 of para 1¹⁰ to mean Indo cld not export certain goods to other areas and cld be forced by US to contribute all products to US. I told him he shld not mix Battle Act¹¹ and UN embargo¹² undertaking with present matter. I told him FonOff note of Jan 23, constituting statement of Indo Govt on export strategic materials to countries of Sov bloc (Embtel 1054)¹³ had not yet to best my knowledge been approved by Dept as satisfying requirements of Battle Act. I thought unfavorable repercussions might follow if Indo Govt now attempted quote that note to convince critics govt not giving all assurances required under Mutual Security Act. I endeavored discourage him from attempting also to include in note of interpretation Indo govt understanding of meaning of “make consistent with its polit and econ stability the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general econ condition”.

I told Subardjo I wld explain situation fully to Pres Sukarno. I said I was convinced as ever that FonMin and I had both worked conscientiously toward getting Indo most advantageous arrangement possible.

Cochran

1. The PIR demand was reported in the Indonesian press. Telegram 1161 also mentioned a number of other articles critical of the Indonesian Government, particularly the Foreign Minister, for acceptance of the terms of the Mutual Security Agreement with the United States. (756D.5 MSP/2–1152)

2. Telegram 856 to Djakarta, Feb. 9, authorized Cochran to inform the Indonesian Government of the acceptability of the quoted phrase. (756D.5 MSP/2–952) At issue here was the language used in the Indonesian note of Jan. 4, 1952 (4 UST 21), the pertinent portion of which reads:

   “1. The Government of Indonesia hereby confirms that it has agreed to…

   “(3) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world.”

   Telegram 856 stated that the wording “of the free and independent nations” was much less desirable than “of the free world”, which phrase had been required of other countries asking for modifications.

3. Sewaka.
4. Feb. 9. Mohammad Roem, Indonesian Minister Without Portfolio.
5. Mohammad Hatta, Vice President of Indonesia.
6. Mohammad Natsir, former Prime Minister of Indonesia and a leader of the Masjumi Party.
7. Soetan Sjahrir, former Prime Minister of Indonesia and a founder and leader of the Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI).
8. Samuel P. Hayes, Chief of the ECA Mission in Indonesia.
9. For text of the agreement for a program of military assistance in the form of constabulary equipment to be supplied by the United States to the Republic of Indonesia, Aug. 15, 1950, see TIAS No. 2306, printed in 2 UST 1619.
10. Quoted in footnote 2, above.
11. Reference is to the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, approved Oct. 26, 1951; 65 Stat. 644. The Battle Act called for termination of U.S. aid to countries engaging in trade involving strategic materials with Communist countries.
12. Reference is to the U.N. economic sanctions against North Korea and the People’s Republic of China.
13. Dated Jan. 23, telegram 1054 forwarded the text of the Indonesian note, which stated that the Indonesian Government did not deem it worthwhile to stop the export of so-called strategic materials which were being sent to some Communist countries in very small quantities. (460.56D9/1–2352)