Office of the Historian

690B.9321/3–954: Telegram

No. 151
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State1

secret
priority
Rangoon, March 9, 1954—11 a.m.

864. Mytel 863.2 Carefully and forcefully reviewed Department’s concern (Deptel 766, Bangkok 1717, Taipei 750)3 and US position re evacuation (Deptel 755, Bangkok 1690, Taipei 740)4 with Acting Foreign Minister5 last night. Especially emphasized difficult position in which US as good offices power being placed by military action, stressed probability military operation being counter-productive. He took careful notes my remarks, stated would study matter. He expressed personal view military operation being grossly exaggerated by press. Said GUB anxious reach settlement KMT problem, free military forces for action against insurgents. He was positive military forces will continue respect cease-fire commitment.

Comment: Kyaw Nyein recognized that BAF bombing could easily result Chinese taking advantage situation to justify refusal evacuation. I believe however that GUB has given up hope of full-scale evacuation through voluntary action of China and considers military pressure only means attaining final solution problem. I [Page 206] am therefore not sanguine that GUB will agree area cease-fire (Bangkok’s 1787 paragraph 1)6 or formally change present concept (mytel 835)7 cease-fire points. Kyaw Nyein made reference short time remaining before rains and necessity Burma army keeping to schedule, resolving KMT problem first then getting on with liquidation insurgency. From this I infer firm decision has been made attempt settle KMT problem militarily before monsoon breaks and that further pressure for radical change in plan would bring no results.

Sebald
  1. Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei.↩
  2. Dated Mar. 8; Sebald reported that he had been unable to associate the Thai Chargé with his approach to the Burmese Foreign Office because the Chargé had no instructions on the subject. (690B.9321/3–854)↩
  3. Document 149.↩
  4. Document 147.↩
  5. U Kyaw Nyein.↩
  6. Telegram 1787, Mar. 3, reported in the first paragraph that the Embassy in Bangkok sent a note to the Burmese Embassy transmitting a Joint Committee estimate that 1,000 more troops would evacuate via Mong Hsat and, a recommendation by the Committee that use of the Feb. 14–28 ceasefire area should be continued. (690B.9321/3–354)↩
  7. Document 148.↩