611.90B/3–554
No. 150
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright)
official–informal
Dear Drum: Reference is made to NSC 5405, “United States Objectives and Course of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia”, dated January 16, 1954,1 copy no. 74 of which was forwarded with instruction no. 7, February 2, 1954.
While fully appreciating the thought and time which must have been spent by the several Agencies of the United States Government in the formulation of this rather formidable document, I feel that it might be helpful to you to have my views on the Burma section. These views are enclosed2 in the form of comments on each paragraph of the Burma section.
First of all, I would like to say that I have the impression that the Burma section has largely resulted from an attempt to reconcile conflicting premises. In consequence, portions of the policy appear to me to be entirely unrealistic. Implementation of some of these sections (specifically, paragraphs 40 and 41), could, I believe, result in irreparable damage to the United States in this part of Asia.
I sense in the offending paragraphs a basic philosophy and belief that only the minority ethnic groups in the Union of Burma are worthy of United States trust and support. And, unless my reading of these paragraphs is entirely wrong, I conclude that United States Government policy envisages working through minority groups (Karens, Kachins, and possibly Shans and others) with the objective of influencing the center. Such a policy certainly puts the cart before the horse and its implementation would not only be fruitless, but dangerous. In support of my contention I will say, as I and my staff have said many times before, that the Government of the Union of Burma (GUB) is a going concern, is anti-communist, and above all else has wide popular support. Our policy toward the GUB, therefore, should be one of sympathetic understanding and designed to strengthen rather that weaken the central government, and should have as its ultimate objective swinging the GUB around to aligning itself with the West. Any action on our part which could result in weakening this ultimate objective is not only self-defeating, [Page 205] but is shortsighted and, in my opinion, not in the best interests of the United States and the Free World.
The Burma policy having been approved by the President as part of the entire document, it of course represents our present policy. I am also aware of the practical difficulties of proposing changes at this time. I do hope, however, that, as a minimum, consideration can be given in the Department to a revised Burma policy for presentation to the NSC at an appropriate time. I think the time has come when we should stop thinking in terms of what happened in Burma in World War II and, whether we like them or not, squarely face realities.
Sincerely yours,
- For text, see Part 1, p. 366.↩
- Not printed.↩