Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/3–1154: Telegram

No. 152
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

secret
priority

Washington, March 11, 1954—6:31 p.m.

796. Burmese military action, and irresponsibility re commitment arms-lift Kengtung, compel examination our position re good offices. Continued harassment outside immediate cease-fire zones, while technically within Burma’s rights, may render Committee offices useless even before March 31 on which date GUB evidently resolved take matters own hands and rely on military action throughout area. If Burmese actually occupied Mong Hai in safety corridor as reported Bangkok’s 1856 (Rangoon 328)² this points up GUB failure fulfill responsibilities of leadership and restrain its military. Question arises whether Committee not morally obliged warn Chinese its guarantee of safe passage no longer holds. If maximum evacuation impeded thereby Burma must bear responsibility.

To date some 4000 troops and 600 dependents plus second phase armament at rate one weapon per 2.7 male soldiers evacuated through good offices Committee, a substantial achievement. Wang has moreover assured Committee 150 daily to March 20 inclusive (1350 troops) and possibly more by March 31 (Bangkok’s 1856 Part II).³ Total over 5000 troops both phases would thus be evacuated through voluntary action of China (your 864 second paragraph).⁴ Chinese now approaching Tachilek from outlying areas can hardly be expected be up-to-date on successively restricted cease-fire zones: wherever attacked will assume cease-fire no longer in effect. Recognizing GUB unwilling restore February 28 cease-fire, consider GUB should at minimum continue present zones, especially Mong Hsat-Tachilek, to March 31 rather than restrict to Mong Kwan March 15.

See Acting Foreign Minister soonest, setting forth above considerations as pertinent and emphatically making known our views:

1. Firmly protest GUB failure honor commitment arms-lift Kengtung (Bangkok’s 1857, 1850 and 1844 to Department)⁵ verbally requesting rectification soonest and filing written protest as outlined your 877⁶ if deemed advisable. Aside from commitment as such, arms arrangement clearly in Burmese interest through stimulating sizeable turn-in thus reducing guerrillas’ armed potential.

2. Request confirmation occupation Mong Hai in safety corridor and if true strongly protest violation, pointing out further violations may be expected unless GUB able restrain military impatience.

3. Request GUB continue present cease-fire areas to March 31. If this not done situation may get out of hand.

4. Re Bangkok’s 1851 (Rangoon 326)⁷ urge GUB make clear intentions re southern cease-fire soonest. Cease-fire in south should not be limited to March 31. If GUB does not soon grant reasonable cease-fire it may force 1500 guerrillas seek arrangement with KNDO.

5. Your 868.⁸ Point out Chinese Government already indicated unwilling accept Chinese residents and urge GUB deliver refugees and prisoners on basis our 774.⁹

6. Point out while Chinese started late they no longer stalling but show convincing evidence of attempting evacuate peacefully. If GUB unwilling cooperate with Committee it should at least not place further obstacles to evacuation as many as possible through Tachilek before GUB takes over entire northern problem March 31.

Smith

1. Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. Supra.
5. None printed. Telegram 1850, Mar. 10, reported that Burma withdrew permission it had previously given the Joint Military Committee to land a plane at Keng Tung to transport the arms surrendered by the evacuees to Taiwan. (690B.9321/31054)
6. Dated Mar. 11; it suggested that the Embassy in Rangoon file a written protest with the Burmese Foreign Office on the basis of assurances previously given the Embassy on the subject. (690B.9321/3–1154)
7. This telegram, Mar. 10, reported that the Thai Government intended to participate in the Mae Sot evacuation as soon as the Burmese Government declared a ceasefire in the Myawadi area and the Tachilek evacuation was completed. (690B.9321/3–1054)
8. Telegram 868 from Rangoon, Mar. 9, reported that Tun Shein asked the Embassy’s help in ascertaining whether the Chinese Government would accept 50 or 60 Chinese residents imprisoned for collaborating with the Chinese troops along with the Chinese prisoners and refugees who were to be repatriated to Taiwan. (690B.9321/3–954)
9. Dated Mar. 5; it stated that the Department considered the question of the interned Chinese residents of Burma to be a question between the Burmese and Chinese Governments which should not become an issue impeding the repatriation of the prisoners and refugees. (690B.9321/3–454)