Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

PPS files, lot. 64 D 563

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)¹

top secret

[Washington,] April 9, 1953.

Subject:

• Guidance given by the Secretary regarding Far Eastern NSC Papers

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Mr. Walter Robertson
• Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
• Mr. Bromley K. Smith
• Mr. Paul H. Nitze
• Mr. H. Freeman Matthews

1. The Secretary thought it was by no means clear that we could get an armistice and settlement in Korea, of the type we desired, unless we continued a course which would make it to the interest of the other side to so do. He doubted that it had been to our interest to cease aggressive hostilities during the armistice negotiations. It was pointed out that the State Department had frequently raised this point in the past, but that our military had always taken the position that they were doing all that they would be doing if there were no negotiations. The Secretary said that he could see the difficulty in asking people to sacrifice their lives when an armistice might be just around the corner, but from an over-all standpoint it may be of great importance to ask them to do so. He thought that one of the alternatives we should be considering was that of carrying on as though no new armistice proposal had been made.

2. The Secretary thought that it was important to secure a military victory in Korea, even though that victory was not of such an extent as to liberate all of Korea. Mr. Johnson said that this would suggest Course I C in NSC 147. Mr. Nitze said that he thought it would be unwise to proceed concurrently with Course I C if one were also going to adopt the cutbacks in military programs implied by NSC 149.²

The Secretary suggested there might be some difference of opinion in the NSC as to whether it would not be advisable to have the budget out of balance for a year or two if this were necessary as part of a program which would achieve such a success as to permit thereafter a sounder balancing of the budget.

3. The Secretary said he thought we should go ahead with expanded programs for Formosa and Indochina. It might be cheaper to combine operations in Korea and from Formosa rather than to attempt to do the job in Korea alone. The Secretary said he knew there were those who thought that a threat to Hainan, or the Chinese coastline, would not necessarily detract from Chinese capabilities in Korea. He questioned whether this was so with regard to ammunition, equipment, planes, etc. He said he found it difficult to believe that protecting 2,000 miles of coastline would have no impact on Chinese capabilities in Korea.

We have always been worried about our difficulties in protecting all points along a 20,000 mile perimeter around the central communist position. In China, we have an opportunity to do against 2,000 miles of coastline what they do to us on a 20,000 mile perimeter. This was an ideal opportunity for exploiting sea and air power. If we are able, ready and willing to exploit this situation that may cave in their negotiating position. He was sure this would place a strain both on China and on Russia. This would give us the best chance of securing our objectives either with fighting or without fighting.

4. The Secretary said he understood the military believed Letourneau’s plans for Indochina were about as good as possible. We ought to back those plans.

5. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Nitze returned to the point that a program of the type that the Secretary had outlined would require increased production, would cost more money, and might involve an expansion of our forces in being. The Secretary said he realized that unless one took everything away from NATO it would have an impact upon production and upon the budget. He questioned, however, whether it would be necessary to expand our forces in being—couldn’t the two divisions in Japan be sent to Korea. This might leave Japan pretty naked, but we may have to take certain calculated risks.

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Nitze referred to the concern that the military felt in leaving Japan completely unguarded against the contingency of an airborne attack. The two United States divisions, plus the Japanese police reserve, add materially to security against this threat. If Japan were to be lost, the position of our forces in Korea would be gravely jeopardized.

The Secretary said Allen Dulles’ briefing at the NSC meeting had indicated that the CIA did not believe the Russians would start a general war to avoid a local defeat in Korea.

6. The Secretary said he thought it would be possible to get money for a program of accomplishment. One can’t get money for a program of going bust and standing still at the same time. Humphrey said we can’t have a deficit of from $5–10 billion a year forever. Such a policy indefinitely pursued did not give one victory abroad and would end up with weakness at home.

7. The Secretary said that he thought the NSC papers missed the core of the thing. He regretted that there was no opportunity at the NSC meetings of having the type of discussion which we had just had. He thought it should be possible to get up a short paper—maybe 3–5 pages in length—which would bring forth the essentials of the problem facing us in the Far East.

1. Participants listed below not previously identified are: U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and Bromley K. Smith, Senior Member of the National Security Council Special Staff.
2. A report entitled “Basic National Security Policies in Relation to Their Costs”, Apr. 3, 1953. For documentation concerning the NSC 149 Series, see volume ii.